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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Churchill”21 pages
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E from mainland bases on 2 0 May. The Umnak field was still far from complete, but American land-based planes would be on hand to greet the Japanese in June. Not even the Seabees would tackle a more diffi- cult job than that credited on Umnak Island to the Army’s aviation engineers. By I June the Eleventh Air Force, so designated on 5 February, had been greatly increased in size and strength. Brig. Gen. William 0. Butler had assumed command in March. From a force of just over 2,200 on 6 December 1941, it had risen to double that strength seven months later. T o the t3d Air Base Group, the 18th Pursuit Squadron, and the 28th Composite Group (comprised of the 73d Bombardment Squadron [MI and the 36th Bombardment Squadron [HI), had been added the I Ith and 54th Fighter squadrons * (the latter on 3 I May) and the 77th Bombardment Squadron (M). The force also included the 4zd Transport Squadron, activated in May.178Much of the equip- ment of P-~o’s,P-39’s, P-38’s, B-17’s, and B-26’s, however, was re- ceived from the United States only in the weeks and days immediately preceding the Japanese attack on Dutch Harbor.+ Meantime, the new base a t Cold Bay had also been put in a state of readine~s.’~~But the provision of additional planes and new bases in the Alaskan area left one grave weakness in its defense, for there was still no adequate aircraft warning service. T h e existence of extensive uninhabited regions made it impossible to develop an Alaskan ground observer corps, with the result that a warning riet had to depend almost entirely upon radar. And in addition to the shortages of equipment and trained men which prevailed elsewhere, special problems impeded efforts to provide radar equipment for Alaska. Sites were usually inac- cessible by road, and in most cases there were no landing fields close enough to permit the aerial supply of radar stations. Thus it became necessary to move equipment by small boats when the pack ice per- mitted; and, because of these problems of transportation, a radar set installed in Alaska-even the so-called mobile equipment-tended to become a fixed station. The time and labor required was made the greater by the necessity to provide quarters for the operators.18’ These considerations made it particularly unfortunate that the directives governing earlier site selection had been imperfect. The necessary ” AAF pursuit and interceptor units had been redesignated “fighter” on 15 May. t See below, pp. 462-65. 307
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