“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
ized, the movement encountered a series of discouraging setbacks: the
depot was so congested with “extra priority” work that prompt action
on the winterization was impossible, cold-weather equipment proved
to be hard to obtain, and bad weather delayed test flights and caused
the loss of some of the planes. It was not until I January 1942 that the
first planes left Sacramento. It was expected that the movement to
Spokane and thence by an inland route through Canada to Fairbanks
would be rapidly completed, but the inexperience of the pilots, to-
gether with poor communications and inadequate landing fields along
the route, delayed execution of the plan. By 2 5 January only thirteen
of the twenty-five pursuit ships had reached Alaska in flyable condi-
tion, while six were still en route, and six had crashed. Of the thirteen
medium bombers, eight had arrived a t Fairbanks, but the other five
had been wrecked beyond repair. It was clear that only crews experi-
enced in Alaskan conditions could be used on such flights, and accord-
ingly the unfinished task of forwarding the aircraft was taken over by
veteran pilots of the Alaskan Air Force. This ill-fated winter project
emphasized the need for special training of squadrons assigned to
Alaska, and during the spring of 1942 familiarization flights between
continental bases and fields in Alaska were conducted by the Fourth
Air Force in preparation for such reinforcement of Alaskan bases as
might be required.lTs
Equally important was the effort to complete the construction of
necessary bases in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. In the Joint Board
decision of 2 6 November 1941 to build an air base on Umnak Island
for protection of the naval base a t Dutch Harbor, it had been specified
that work on the new field would not be pushed a t the expense of
previously approved projects in presumably more vital areas.l 7 4 After
Pearl Harbor, however, it was clear that construction of the Umnak
base presented a task of the highest priority, as also did rapid comple-
tion of an intermediate field which the Civil Aeronautics Adminis-
tration had undertaken to build at Cold Bay.175Lying between Kodiak
and Dutch Harbor, the latter base could be used in support of actions
a t either of those two points.
It was not only necessary to move fast but at the same time to act
with the greatest possible secrecy. As an aid to concealment of con-
struction efforts from the enemy, the Army operated under the cover
of fictitious corporations. For the Cold Bay project “Saxton and Com-
pany” was invented, and, in its name, equipment and supplies were
304