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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
ized, the movement encountered a series of discouraging setbacks: the
depot was so congested with “extra priority” work that prompt action
on the winterization was impossible, cold-weather equipment proved
to be hard to obtain, and bad weather delayed test flights and caused
the loss of some of the planes. It was not until I January 1942 that the
first planes left Sacramento. It was expected that the movement to
Spokane and thence by an inland route through Canada to Fairbanks
would be rapidly completed, but the inexperience of the pilots, to-
gether with poor communications and inadequate landing fields along
the route, delayed execution of the plan. By 2 5 January only thirteen
of the twenty-five pursuit ships had reached Alaska in flyable condi-
tion, while six were still en route, and six had crashed. Of the thirteen
medium bombers, eight had arrived a t Fairbanks, but the other five
had been wrecked beyond repair. It was clear that only crews experi-
enced in Alaskan conditions could be used on such flights, and accord-
ingly the unfinished task of forwarding the aircraft was taken over by
veteran pilots of the Alaskan Air Force. This ill-fated winter project
emphasized the need for special training of squadrons assigned to
Alaska, and during the spring of 1942 familiarization flights between
continental bases and fields in Alaska were conducted by the Fourth
Air Force in preparation for such reinforcement of Alaskan bases as
might be required.lTs
Equally important was the effort to complete the construction of
necessary bases in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. In the Joint Board
decision of 2 6 November 1941 to build an air base on Umnak Island
for protection of the naval base a t Dutch Harbor, it had been specified
that work on the new field would not be pushed a t the expense of
previously approved projects in presumably more vital areas.l 7 4 After
Pearl Harbor, however, it was clear that construction of the Umnak
base presented a task of the highest priority, as also did rapid comple-
tion of an intermediate field which the Civil Aeronautics Adminis-
tration had undertaken to build at Cold Bay.175Lying between Kodiak
and Dutch Harbor, the latter base could be used in support of actions
a t either of those two points.
It was not only necessary to move fast but at the same time to act
with the greatest possible secrecy. As an aid to concealment of con-
struction efforts from the enemy, the Army operated under the cover
of fictitious corporations. For the Cold Bay project “Saxton and Com-
pany” was invented, and, in its name, equipment and supplies were
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