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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
ized, the movement encountered a series of discouraging setbacks: the
depot was so congested with “extra priority” work that prompt action
on the winterization was impossible, cold-weather equipment proved
to be hard to obtain, and bad weather delayed test flights and caused
the loss of some of the planes. It was not until I January 1942 that the
first planes left Sacramento. It was expected that the movement to
Spokane and thence by an inland route through Canada to Fairbanks
would be rapidly completed, but the inexperience of the pilots, to-
gether with poor communications and inadequate landing fields along
the route, delayed execution of the plan. By 2 5 January only thirteen
of the twenty-five pursuit ships had reached Alaska in flyable condi-
tion, while six were still en route, and six had crashed. Of the thirteen
medium bombers, eight had arrived a t Fairbanks, but the other five
had been wrecked beyond repair. It was clear that only crews experi-
enced in Alaskan conditions could be used on such flights, and accord-
ingly the unfinished task of forwarding the aircraft was taken over by
veteran pilots of the Alaskan Air Force. This ill-fated winter project
emphasized the need for special training of squadrons assigned to
Alaska, and during the spring of 1942 familiarization flights between
continental bases and fields in Alaska were conducted by the Fourth
Air Force in preparation for such reinforcement of Alaskan bases as
might be required.lTs
Equally important was the effort to complete the construction of
necessary bases in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. In the Joint Board
decision of 2 6 November 1941 to build an air base on Umnak Island
for protection of the naval base a t Dutch Harbor, it had been specified
that work on the new field would not be pushed a t the expense of
previously approved projects in presumably more vital areas.l 7 4 After
Pearl Harbor, however, it was clear that construction of the Umnak
base presented a task of the highest priority, as also did rapid comple-
tion of an intermediate field which the Civil Aeronautics Adminis-
tration had undertaken to build at Cold Bay.175Lying between Kodiak
and Dutch Harbor, the latter base could be used in support of actions
a t either of those two points.
It was not only necessary to move fast but at the same time to act
with the greatest possible secrecy. As an aid to concealment of con-
struction efforts from the enemy, the Army operated under the cover
of fictitious corporations. For the Cold Bay project “Saxton and Com-
pany” was invented, and, in its name, equipment and supplies were
304

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.