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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E reduced, however, by the necessity of using the planes as a supple- ment to radar in the identification of and indeed no matter how many planes were supplied, the defense of the canal would remain imperfect until better means for detection of an approaching enemy had been provided. This problem was not solved until 1943. Reinforcements and New Bases for Alaska Fortunately, when the enemy struck, the blow fell on the Aleutians and not in Panama. T h e defenses of the Alaskan area were no better prepared, but the stake was smaller. In December 1941, fundamental questions regarding air defense plans in the North Pacific had hardly been solved; it was not until 26 November that the decision had finally been made to build an airfield on Umnak Island for the protection of Dutch Harbor.” Substantial progress had been made under earlier and more limited plans of defense; but only a handful of combat planes were based on Elmendorf Field a t Anchorage, and preparations for moving up air reinforcements from the States in the event of an emergency were still imperfect.17’ After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that emergency seemed unmistakably imminent. T h e Chief of Staff informed the President in January 1942 that the W a r Department feared a damaging raid on Alaska “at any moment,” and prophesied that as soon as the Japanese could assemble troops and ships they would launch an effort toward actual occupation” of a base in that area.171This prospect had led to a prompt decision to send aerial reinforcements to the threatened out- post, even in the face of the well-understood risks of winter flights along imperfectly developed airways.’ 7 2 Because Alaska was part of the Western Theater of Operations, responsibility for the movement was assigned to the Western Defense Command. T h e shortage of trained aircrews made it necessary to assign to this project squadrons composed of men untrained in Alaskan flight conditions. A pursuit squadron of twenty-five P-40’s was secured by assignment of the I I th Pursuit Squadron from Meridian, Mississippi, and thirteen B-2 6 me- dium bombers were ordered to be flown to Alaska by the 77th Bom- bardment Squadron from Boise, Idaho. Notification of the movement was given on 10 December 1941,but two weeks elapsed before the planes reached the Sacramento Air Depot to be winterized. Hastily conceived and inadequately organ- d i * See above, pp. 167-68. 3 0 3
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