“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Watt, the British radar expert, examined Panama defenses and reported
the existence of disturbing weaknesses. The canal, in the opinion of
the British observer, fully justified the concern being shown for its
safety, for it was “unique in the world, possessing only four vital
points, each of small area, but each so fragile that a single projectile
on any of the four could cut this vital line of communications, and
two projectiles on any one of three could prevent its re-establishment
within two years.” 16’ He agreed with American strategists that the
most probable form of attack was a carrier-based raid from the Pacific
and estimated that the Japanese could well afford to sacrifice four
carriers in an attempt to block the use of the canal. Secretary Stimson
reported to President Roosevelt his conviction that the planes from
even one carrier could cripple the canal and that if two or more car-
riers participated in an attack there would be a strong probability of
success. Some means of intercepting carriers far to the west of Panama
was urgently needed, because once “a carrier has released its planes
for attack, no subsequent means of defense against those planes can
sufficiently ensure the safety of the Canal.” 162 An adequate defense
required early detection-and destruction-of enemy carriers at dis-
tances of 500 to 1,000 miles offshore, and since shore-based radars
could not reach that distance, the only solution was long-range aerial
patrol. Even with such surveillance, a carrier might escape notice long
enough to launch its planes, and therefore patrols would need to be
supplemented by an effective cordon of coastal radars to provide a
twenty-minute warning to alert fighters and antiaircraft batteries for
a “last-ditch” defense of the canal.
An adequate patrol on the Pacific side of the canal would require
coverage of an arc of 400-mile depth extending from an inner semi-
circle 600 nautical miles west of Panama to an outer limit of 1,000
miles and from the coast of southern Mexico to northern Peru.16sT o
patrol this extensive zone, aircrews needed the assistance of ASV
radar, which could detect ships a t distances of twenty-five to fifty
miles, and of bases at Tehuantepec in Mexico, at the city of Guate-
mala or San JosC in Guatemala, on the Galapagos Islands, at Salinas in
Ecuador, and a t Talara in Peru.” Of this proposed chain, only the
bases at the city of Guatemala and Salinas were in use at the time of
Mr. Stimson’s visit to the Canal Zone. A field in the Galapagos was
under construction in accordance with an agreement with Ecuador
‘See map on opposite page.
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