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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E
against civilian populations and rushed all available training gas masks
-more than 600,000 in number-to the Western Defense Command
for issue to police, air raid wardens, and other key civilians.*s5These
measures were accompanied by a newspaper campaign designed to
prevent “undue excitement” in the event of a raid.’56 A general fear
of reprisal was translated into sharp calls for action when intelligence
was received in mid-May of the impending moves of the Japanese
against Midway and the Aleutians.* Steps were taken a t once to
strengthen the defense forces along the western seaboard. General
Marshall personally visited the Pacific coast and ordered additional
antiaircraft artillery and barrage balloon units to the An air
task force from the Second Air Force was moved to coastal stations
in support of the Fourth Air Force.’” T h e danger seemed so acute by
I June that the pending movement of the air echelon of the Eighth
Air Force was and on the following day the 97th Bom-
bardment Group (H) left the concentration area in N e w England to
fly in two elements to McChord Field in Washington and to Hammer
Field in California. Similarly, the 1st Pursuit Group on 5 June flew
from Maine to Morris Field in North Carolina under orders to proceed
to the West Coast. But the Japanese fleet already had been defeated
west of Midway, and on the 6th the pursuit group returned to Dow
Field.+
Reappraisal of Panama Canal Air Defenses
T h e critical examination of air defenses which had followed the
Pearl Harbor attack naturally included a re-examination of the defense
of the Panama Canal. Plans made in 1940-41 for protection of the
canal had anticipated that the chief danger would come from the
eastern approaches, but now the emphasis shifted.16’ Recently acquired
Caribbean bases and operational rights and facilities provided by an
understanding with Brazil came to be of primary importance as step-
pingstones on the ferrying route to Africa or for use in the mainte-
nance of antisubmarine pat,rols. T h e real danger to the canal was from
the Pacific side, where virtually nothing had been provided by way of
outlying defense and where, geographically, the canal was most
exposed to surprise attack.
Early in March 1942, both Secretary of W a r Stimson and Watson-
* See below, Chap. 12.
t See below, pp. 641-43.
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