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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
were transferred to Mexico for installation a t sites in Lower Cali-
fornia. Meantime, a t the other extremity of the Pacific coast defense
zone, arrangements had been completed with the Canadians to provide
advance warning of aircraft approaching the vital Seattle-Bremerton
region from across the international border. This result was achieved
by having reports from radar installations in British Columbia relayed
to the Seattle information center.14DRelations with Canada on defense
measures were intimate, and joint planning was carried to the point
of providing for a united command of American-Canadian forces in
the event of a major attack. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense,
created in August 1940, provided machinery for the co-operatioh of
Canadian-United States forces,* and a practical arrangement adopted
early in 1942 permitted decentralization to regional commanders of the
power to conclude agreements required for the common defense.lso
In addition to perfecting the radar network, the Western Defense
Command devoted itself to increasing the efficiency of the civilian
personnel of ground observer corps. The organization of the home
front for air defense represented a unique problem in modern Amer-
ican military experience. Although President Wilson had spoken of a
total war effort in World War I ("it is not an army we must shape and
train for war; it is a nation" 15'), it was in World War 11, for the first
time, that the home front shared actively in preparations for its own
defense. Many critics-among them Watson-Watt 152-doubted that a
system dependent on volunteer effort could produce reliable informa-
tion of the type required in a modern warning system. Serious prob-
lems in the large-scale use of civilians were e n c o ~ n t e r e d , ' ~ ~but the
remarkable fact is that more than 6,000 observer posts in the United
States were regularly, and with increasing efficiency, manned by
volunteers whose efforts-especially at rural stations-represented real
sacrifice.
Interest in the air defenses of the West Coast reached a climax in
the alerts which preceded and accompanied the Battle of Midway.
T h e Doolittle raid against Japan on I 8 April I 942 convinced American
authorities that the Japanese would be satisfied, in retaliation, only by
a blow against the US. mainland. In a speech at Chicago on 19 April,
James M. Landis, director of the Office of Civilian Defense, began the
campaign to prepare the country for a revenge bombing.ls4 The War
Department even feared that the Japanese might try to use poison gas
* See above, p. 121.
2 9 8 Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.