“Roosevelt”53 pages
- p. 5 …Imprint
N March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the
Director of the Bureau of…
- p. 138 …1939-4I
N 28 January 1938 President Roosevelt declared our national
defenses inadequate in the face…
- p. 141 …changed our requirements
for defensive aviation,” President Roosevelt strongly urged that $300,-
ooo,ooo be appropriated…
- p. 153 …When President Roosevelt initiated the move toward re-
I 16
- p. 160 …T h e first step was made public on 3 September 1940 when President
Roosevelt revealed…
- p. 165 …These sentiments were expressed by President Roosevelt in a radio
address on 3 September: “This Nation…
- p. 169 …In an address to Congress on 6 January 1941, President
Roosevelt suggested the means; 9 5…
- p. 170 …O n 9 July 1941, President Roosevelt requested the secretaries of
W a r and the…
- p. 171 …The British had prepared, a t the instigation of President Roosevelt,
an estimate of munitions requirements…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 174 …cent; other
nations, 10 per cent.'"
President Roosevelt, anxious that as many planes as possible be…
- p. 185 …President Roosevelt’s request for the report had been
motivated wholly by considerations of logistics. But…
- p. 199 …On 5 July 1941
President Roosevelt, in oral orders to the Army Chief of Staff and…
- p. 220 …and it carried a threat which President Roosevelt
described in terms of the greatest danger faced…
- p. 258 …conflict between Japan and the
U.S. Roosevelt attempt curve our independence stop we all know…
- p. 273 …President Roosevelt specifically directed that reinforcements
should be sent there with all speed, and MacArthur was…
- p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs
of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
- p. 287 …evening, the British
party met with President Roosevelt and his military and civilian
advisers a t…
- p. 297 …O n 3 January President Roosevelt sent Mr. Stimson a list of muni-
tions, with a…
- p. 301 …In his address to
the Congress on 6 January, President Roosevelt promised that “we
shall not…
- p. 302 …Ultimate decisions on major
military policies were taken by President Roosevelt, as Commander
in Chief of…
- p. 304 …Leahy as personal chief of staff to President
Roosevelt in place of Admiral Stark.'* It was…
- p. 322 …given to the nation by Presi-
dent Roosevelt in a radio address on 9 D e…
- p. 331 …At the end of January, President Roosevelt
advised the President of Venezuela that, in deference to…
- p. 332 …During the course of a fireside report to the nation delivered by
President Roosevelt on 2…
- p. 352 …Secretary Stimson
reported to President Roosevelt his conviction that the planes from
even one carrier could…
- p. 366 …raised objections
which seemed convincing.8 President Roosevelt decided to adopt the
more modest proposal of…
- p. 370 …Elliott Roosevelt during the
summer on an aerial survey of the east coast of Greenland in…
- p. 400 …Elliott Roosevelt and others failed
to locate a suitable site for an airdrome.120A satisfactory site…
- p. 409 …mobilizing the resources of the airlines, President
Roosevelt had signed an executive order on 13 December…
- p. 465 …for effective
resistance in the Philippines, President Roosevelt had decided early in
February that the general…
- p. 480 …the basis of a proposal by President Roosevelt: there would
be a separate Southwest Pacific Area…
- p. 499 …Apparently
President Roosevelt himself played a role in initiating the expedition,
although it is not possible…
- p. 553 …Lauchlin Currie had gone to
China as economic adviser to President Roosevelt for study of her…
- p. 630 …in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered
on 5 March, in which the Prime…
- p. 632 …plan was approved in principle by President Roosevelt, and on
8 April General Marshall and Harry…
- p. 633 …message of 1 7 April, in-
formed Roosevelt of his approval of the design; his sole…
- p. 635 …A fortnight later, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff were alarmed by a query from Roosevelt as…
- p. 640 …in Norway-and they understood that President Roosevelt’s
anxiety to get U.S. troops into…
- p. 641 …On 8 July the Prime
Minister informed Roosevelt that conditions favorable to SLEDGE-
HAMMER would probably…
- p. 642 …on the ~ 4 t h . ~ ‘Ap-
parently Roosevelt gave his tentative approval in a telephone conver…
- p. 753 …This book shows the
close relations between Roosevelt and
the Committee T o Defend America by…
- p. 755 …Address by President Roosevelt at
Washington, 27 Oct. 1941, in Peace and
War, pp. 767-72…
- p. 756 …Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson, 18
Sept. 1941,in WP I-General.
I I I . Release of…
- p. 774 …Memo for Roosevelt from Stim-
son, 14 Mar. 1942.
163. lbid.
164. History, Sixth Air Force…
- p. 776 …Elliott Roosevelt,
zIst Recon. Sq. to TAG, 8 Sept. 1941;
memo for Col. Olds from Capt…
- p. 779 …Elliott
Roosevelt to TAG, 6 July 1941; Atlantic
Bridge, pp. 27-29.
117. Ltr., Sec. of…
- p. 780 …Elliott Roosevelt to T A G , 3 Aug. 1941
(Report # 3 ) ; ltr., Capt. Elliott Roosevelt
to…
- p. 782 …Memo for S / W from President
Roosevelt, 6 May 1942, in ATC 321.
199. On the…
- p. 790 …Mills to TAG, Mac-
Arthur for Roosevelt, 11 Feb. 1942; msg.
#5, Australia to Marshall, 2…
- p. 802 …President Roosevelt had approved
the induction as early as 18 December
1941, contingent upon approval of…
- p. 857 …See also Coolidge;
Harding; Roosevelt; Wilson.
Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45
Press comment…
- p. 858 …Erwin, 330, 339-41, 512
Roosevelt, Capt. Elliott, 3 18, 344
Roosevelt, Pres. F.D., 101…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
were transferred to Mexico for installation a t sites in Lower Cali-
fornia. Meantime, a t the other extremity of the Pacific coast defense
zone, arrangements had been completed with the Canadians to provide
advance warning of aircraft approaching the vital Seattle-Bremerton
region from across the international border. This result was achieved
by having reports from radar installations in British Columbia relayed
to the Seattle information center.14DRelations with Canada on defense
measures were intimate, and joint planning was carried to the point
of providing for a united command of American-Canadian forces in
the event of a major attack. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense,
created in August 1940, provided machinery for the co-operatioh of
Canadian-United States forces,* and a practical arrangement adopted
early in 1942 permitted decentralization to regional commanders of the
power to conclude agreements required for the common defense.lso
In addition to perfecting the radar network, the Western Defense
Command devoted itself to increasing the efficiency of the civilian
personnel of ground observer corps. The organization of the home
front for air defense represented a unique problem in modern Amer-
ican military experience. Although President Wilson had spoken of a
total war effort in World War I ("it is not an army we must shape and
train for war; it is a nation" 15'), it was in World War 11, for the first
time, that the home front shared actively in preparations for its own
defense. Many critics-among them Watson-Watt 152-doubted that a
system dependent on volunteer effort could produce reliable informa-
tion of the type required in a modern warning system. Serious prob-
lems in the large-scale use of civilians were e n c o ~ n t e r e d , ' ~ ~but the
remarkable fact is that more than 6,000 observer posts in the United
States were regularly, and with increasing efficiency, manned by
volunteers whose efforts-especially at rural stations-represented real
sacrifice.
Interest in the air defenses of the West Coast reached a climax in
the alerts which preceded and accompanied the Battle of Midway.
T h e Doolittle raid against Japan on I 8 April I 942 convinced American
authorities that the Japanese would be satisfied, in retaliation, only by
a blow against the US. mainland. In a speech at Chicago on 19 April,
James M. Landis, director of the Office of Civilian Defense, began the
campaign to prepare the country for a revenge bombing.ls4 The War
Department even feared that the Japanese might try to use poison gas
* See above, p. 121.
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