“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
were transferred to Mexico for installation a t sites in Lower Cali-
fornia. Meantime, a t the other extremity of the Pacific coast defense
zone, arrangements had been completed with the Canadians to provide
advance warning of aircraft approaching the vital Seattle-Bremerton
region from across the international border. This result was achieved
by having reports from radar installations in British Columbia relayed
to the Seattle information center.14DRelations with Canada on defense
measures were intimate, and joint planning was carried to the point
of providing for a united command of American-Canadian forces in
the event of a major attack. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense,
created in August 1940, provided machinery for the co-operatioh of
Canadian-United States forces,* and a practical arrangement adopted
early in 1942 permitted decentralization to regional commanders of the
power to conclude agreements required for the common defense.lso
In addition to perfecting the radar network, the Western Defense
Command devoted itself to increasing the efficiency of the civilian
personnel of ground observer corps. The organization of the home
front for air defense represented a unique problem in modern Amer-
ican military experience. Although President Wilson had spoken of a
total war effort in World War I ("it is not an army we must shape and
train for war; it is a nation" 15'), it was in World War 11, for the first
time, that the home front shared actively in preparations for its own
defense. Many critics-among them Watson-Watt 152-doubted that a
system dependent on volunteer effort could produce reliable informa-
tion of the type required in a modern warning system. Serious prob-
lems in the large-scale use of civilians were e n c o ~ n t e r e d , ' ~ ~but the
remarkable fact is that more than 6,000 observer posts in the United
States were regularly, and with increasing efficiency, manned by
volunteers whose efforts-especially at rural stations-represented real
sacrifice.
Interest in the air defenses of the West Coast reached a climax in
the alerts which preceded and accompanied the Battle of Midway.
T h e Doolittle raid against Japan on I 8 April I 942 convinced American
authorities that the Japanese would be satisfied, in retaliation, only by
a blow against the US. mainland. In a speech at Chicago on 19 April,
James M. Landis, director of the Office of Civilian Defense, began the
campaign to prepare the country for a revenge bombing.ls4 The War
Department even feared that the Japanese might try to use poison gas
* See above, p. 121.
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