Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Air Force through its subordinate interceptor and bomber commands.
The air force provided planes to defend vital targets and to conduct
offshore patrols, supplied an aircraft warning service to alert both
military and civilian agencies, and through regional commanders inte-
grated all elements of the air defense. In accordance with the require-
ments of this last function, units of the 4th Antiaircraft Command-an
Army Ground Forces unit-were placed under operational control of
the IV Interceptor Command. On the East Coast a similar pattern
established the First Air Force as the air arm of the Eastern Defense
Command. But much of the attention of the I Bomber Command was
directed to antisubmarine operations, and, in order to assure closer
co-operation with the Navy, control of the bomber units was trans-
ferred on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and Western Defense Com-
mands that the specific measures required to correct the deficiencies
noted in the Watson-Watt report were undertaken. At no time prior
to the Battle of Midway in June 1942 were the air defenses of either
coast really adequate to repel a major attack, but significant progress
was made in improving the aircraft warning nets and in perfecting
plans by which the small forces of aircraft assigned to coastal defense
duties could be quickly reinforced from inland stations. The record
within the Western Defense Command will illustrate the achievements
of the first half of 1942. The radar net, which had consisted of ten
stations on 7 December 1941, was expanded by the addition of fifteen
new Many of the original sites having proved unsuitable,
extensive resiting work was carried out. The process was difficult,
costly, and time-consuming. Rugged terrain often made the work
difficult even for experts-and there were few men of experience avail-
able. Good radar sites often were relatively inaccessible, far removed
from roads, communications, power, and water; it was frequently
necessary to build pioneer trails or roads for considerable distances
before preliminary tests of radar equipment could be made, and the
eflort might be wasted then by the discovery of unpredictable oper-
ational difficulties. When the Western Defense Command desired an
expansion of radar coverage to protect California's southern flank,
delicate diplomacy was required to assure Mexico that no infringement
of her national sovereignty was ~ontemp1ated.l~~Late in May 1942
the negotiations resulted in an agreement by which three radar sets
* See below, Chap. 15.
296

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.