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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 75 …In the North Pacific only the narrow Bering Strait separated Siberia from Alaska, and farther south…
  • p. 242 …O R+ POI NT HAWAIIAN I SLA PACIFIC OCEAN 196 o w s U I DS
  • p. 322 …any one of many points in both oceans and along our coast lines and against the…
  • p. 332 …The shots seemed designed to punctuate the President’s statement that “the broad oceans which have…
  • p. 387 …Another Indian Ocean route was proposed that would have connected Mombasa with Ceylon or Bangalore, India…
  • p. 480 …Nimitz as commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Area, whose responsibilities included the maintenance of…
  • p. 489 …Defense of the South Pacific Route It has been indicated elsewhere that the fear of just…
  • p. 515 …Chester Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Area, could not know of the debates…
  • p. 537 …Pacific Ocean,’ but the division of command between the Army and Navy in the Pacific naturally…
  • p. 630 …T h e United States was asked to provide additional air strength for the Pacific, to…
  • p. 775 …Transport Cornand‘s Ocean Ferry (London, 1945), pp. 5-19; Summary of Information covering the organization…
  • p. 791 …ON1 Combat Narratives, Early Raids in the Pacific Ocean, I Feb.-ro Mar. 1942; RAAF Intel…
  • p. 797 …This action was to be co-ordinated with an operation in the South Pacific against Tulagi…
  • p. 833 …Headquarters, VIII Bomber Command, High Wycombe Prime Minister Pacific Ocean Area New Caledonia Task Force Plan…
  • p. 850 …336407 3537 356, 3803 395-96, q857 496 India-China Ferry, organization, 508 Indian Ocean, 33…
  • p. 856 …I , 432, 477 Pacific Fleet (US.), 137, 19697, 236, 272-73 Pacific Ocean Area, 419, 452…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Air Force through its subordinate interceptor and bomber commands.
The air force provided planes to defend vital targets and to conduct
offshore patrols, supplied an aircraft warning service to alert both
military and civilian agencies, and through regional commanders inte-
grated all elements of the air defense. In accordance with the require-
ments of this last function, units of the 4th Antiaircraft Command-an
Army Ground Forces unit-were placed under operational control of
the IV Interceptor Command. On the East Coast a similar pattern
established the First Air Force as the air arm of the Eastern Defense
Command. But much of the attention of the I Bomber Command was
directed to antisubmarine operations, and, in order to assure closer
co-operation with the Navy, control of the bomber units was trans-
ferred on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and Western Defense Com-
mands that the specific measures required to correct the deficiencies
noted in the Watson-Watt report were undertaken. At no time prior
to the Battle of Midway in June 1942 were the air defenses of either
coast really adequate to repel a major attack, but significant progress
was made in improving the aircraft warning nets and in perfecting
plans by which the small forces of aircraft assigned to coastal defense
duties could be quickly reinforced from inland stations. The record
within the Western Defense Command will illustrate the achievements
of the first half of 1942. The radar net, which had consisted of ten
stations on 7 December 1941, was expanded by the addition of fifteen
new Many of the original sites having proved unsuitable,
extensive resiting work was carried out. The process was difficult,
costly, and time-consuming. Rugged terrain often made the work
difficult even for experts-and there were few men of experience avail-
able. Good radar sites often were relatively inaccessible, far removed
from roads, communications, power, and water; it was frequently
necessary to build pioneer trails or roads for considerable distances
before preliminary tests of radar equipment could be made, and the
eflort might be wasted then by the discovery of unpredictable oper-
ational difficulties. When the Western Defense Command desired an
expansion of radar coverage to protect California's southern flank,
delicate diplomacy was required to assure Mexico that no infringement
of her national sovereignty was ~ontemp1ated.l~~Late in May 1942
the negotiations resulted in an agreement by which three radar sets
* See below, Chap. 15.
296

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.