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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Air Force through its subordinate interceptor and bomber commands.
The air force provided planes to defend vital targets and to conduct
offshore patrols, supplied an aircraft warning service to alert both
military and civilian agencies, and through regional commanders inte-
grated all elements of the air defense. In accordance with the require-
ments of this last function, units of the 4th Antiaircraft Command-an
Army Ground Forces unit-were placed under operational control of
the IV Interceptor Command. On the East Coast a similar pattern
established the First Air Force as the air arm of the Eastern Defense
Command. But much of the attention of the I Bomber Command was
directed to antisubmarine operations, and, in order to assure closer
co-operation with the Navy, control of the bomber units was trans-
ferred on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier."
It was accordingly within the Eastern and Western Defense Com-
mands that the specific measures required to correct the deficiencies
noted in the Watson-Watt report were undertaken. At no time prior
to the Battle of Midway in June 1942 were the air defenses of either
coast really adequate to repel a major attack, but significant progress
was made in improving the aircraft warning nets and in perfecting
plans by which the small forces of aircraft assigned to coastal defense
duties could be quickly reinforced from inland stations. The record
within the Western Defense Command will illustrate the achievements
of the first half of 1942. The radar net, which had consisted of ten
stations on 7 December 1941, was expanded by the addition of fifteen
new Many of the original sites having proved unsuitable,
extensive resiting work was carried out. The process was difficult,
costly, and time-consuming. Rugged terrain often made the work
difficult even for experts-and there were few men of experience avail-
able. Good radar sites often were relatively inaccessible, far removed
from roads, communications, power, and water; it was frequently
necessary to build pioneer trails or roads for considerable distances
before preliminary tests of radar equipment could be made, and the
eflort might be wasted then by the discovery of unpredictable oper-
ational difficulties. When the Western Defense Command desired an
expansion of radar coverage to protect California's southern flank,
delicate diplomacy was required to assure Mexico that no infringement
of her national sovereignty was ~ontemp1ated.l~~Late in May 1942
the negotiations resulted in an agreement by which three radar sets
* See below, Chap. 15.
296

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