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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
sharper definition of individual targets was possible. His enthusiasm,
and the sustained research efforts of a large number of scientists at the
Radiation Laboratory, led to the production within six months of a
practical working model. By 1944, perfected MEW radar was ready
to assist in the invasion of Europe, and the offensive employment of
this new instrument revolutionized conceptions of what radar could
A weapon inspired by the problem of defending the West Coast
thus proved to be a valuable contribution to victory in other theaters.
Helpful, also, to an immediate improvement of continental air
defenses were organizational changes which served to clarify respon-
sibilities. The Western Defense Command had been designated a
theater of operations on 1 1 December 1941,with General DeWitt
in command. With its headquarters a t San Francisco, the command
included an extensive area of nine western states, Alaska, and the
Aleutians, and to it three air forces were initially assigned-the Fourth
and Second Air Forces along the Pacific coast and, in addition, the
Alaskan Air Force. A similar situation existed on the other side of the
continent, where on 2 0 December the Eastern Theater of Operations
was established with headquarters in New York City and with Lt.
Gen. Hugh Drum in command of defense units in the eastern seaboard
states and in Newfoundland and Bermuda. T w o air forces, the First
and the Third, were assigned to this theater.13’ Thus all four of the
domestic air forces, which had been created early in 1941 and had
been operating under the Air Force Combat Command, were removed
from AAF control and placed under theater commanders. It is not sur-
prising that this arrangement pleased no one: the defense commands
found it confusing to have more than one subordinate air force com-
mander, while the AAF felt that its combat training program would
be jeopardized if it had no direct control of any of the continental air
forces. A compromise was aecordingly worked out and announced on
3 0 December 1 9 4 1 . ~ ~ ’The essential element of the new plan was a
provision which called for moving two of the continental air forces
to inland stations and assigning them to the AAF as “training Air
Forces.” T o effect this arrangement, the Second Air Force relin-
quished its coastal stations in Washington and Oregon and was re-
moved from assignment to the Western Defense Command; air defense
duties for the entire Pacific coast were thereupon assigned to the
Fourth Air Force. A similar move within the Eastern Defense Com-
mand made the Third Air Force a training unit under the AAF, while
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