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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
sharper definition of individual targets was possible. His enthusiasm,
and the sustained research efforts of a large number of scientists at the
Radiation Laboratory, led to the production within six months of a
practical working model. By 1944, perfected MEW radar was ready
to assist in the invasion of Europe, and the offensive employment of
this new instrument revolutionized conceptions of what radar could
A weapon inspired by the problem of defending the West Coast
thus proved to be a valuable contribution to victory in other theaters.
Helpful, also, to an immediate improvement of continental air
defenses were organizational changes which served to clarify respon-
sibilities. The Western Defense Command had been designated a
theater of operations on 1 1 December 1941,with General DeWitt
in command. With its headquarters a t San Francisco, the command
included an extensive area of nine western states, Alaska, and the
Aleutians, and to it three air forces were initially assigned-the Fourth
and Second Air Forces along the Pacific coast and, in addition, the
Alaskan Air Force. A similar situation existed on the other side of the
continent, where on 2 0 December the Eastern Theater of Operations
was established with headquarters in New York City and with Lt.
Gen. Hugh Drum in command of defense units in the eastern seaboard
states and in Newfoundland and Bermuda. T w o air forces, the First
and the Third, were assigned to this theater.13’ Thus all four of the
domestic air forces, which had been created early in 1941 and had
been operating under the Air Force Combat Command, were removed
from AAF control and placed under theater commanders. It is not sur-
prising that this arrangement pleased no one: the defense commands
found it confusing to have more than one subordinate air force com-
mander, while the AAF felt that its combat training program would
be jeopardized if it had no direct control of any of the continental air
forces. A compromise was aecordingly worked out and announced on
3 0 December 1 9 4 1 . ~ ~ ’The essential element of the new plan was a
provision which called for moving two of the continental air forces
to inland stations and assigning them to the AAF as “training Air
Forces.” T o effect this arrangement, the Second Air Force relin-
quished its coastal stations in Washington and Oregon and was re-
moved from assignment to the Western Defense Command; air defense
duties for the entire Pacific coast were thereupon assigned to the
Fourth Air Force. A similar move within the Eastern Defense Com-
mand made the Third Air Force a training unit under the AAF, while
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.