“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
sharper definition of individual targets was possible. His enthusiasm,
and the sustained research efforts of a large number of scientists at the
Radiation Laboratory, led to the production within six months of a
practical working model. By 1944, perfected MEW radar was ready
to assist in the invasion of Europe, and the offensive employment of
this new instrument revolutionized conceptions of what radar could
A weapon inspired by the problem of defending the West Coast
thus proved to be a valuable contribution to victory in other theaters.
Helpful, also, to an immediate improvement of continental air
defenses were organizational changes which served to clarify respon-
sibilities. The Western Defense Command had been designated a
theater of operations on 1 1 December 1941,with General DeWitt
in command. With its headquarters a t San Francisco, the command
included an extensive area of nine western states, Alaska, and the
Aleutians, and to it three air forces were initially assigned-the Fourth
and Second Air Forces along the Pacific coast and, in addition, the
Alaskan Air Force. A similar situation existed on the other side of the
continent, where on 2 0 December the Eastern Theater of Operations
was established with headquarters in New York City and with Lt.
Gen. Hugh Drum in command of defense units in the eastern seaboard
states and in Newfoundland and Bermuda. T w o air forces, the First
and the Third, were assigned to this theater.13’ Thus all four of the
domestic air forces, which had been created early in 1941 and had
been operating under the Air Force Combat Command, were removed
from AAF control and placed under theater commanders. It is not sur-
prising that this arrangement pleased no one: the defense commands
found it confusing to have more than one subordinate air force com-
mander, while the AAF felt that its combat training program would
be jeopardized if it had no direct control of any of the continental air
forces. A compromise was aecordingly worked out and announced on
3 0 December 1 9 4 1 . ~ ~ ’The essential element of the new plan was a
provision which called for moving two of the continental air forces
to inland stations and assigning them to the AAF as “training Air
Forces.” T o effect this arrangement, the Second Air Force relin-
quished its coastal stations in Washington and Oregon and was re-
moved from assignment to the Western Defense Command; air defense
duties for the entire Pacific coast were thereupon assigned to the
Fourth Air Force. A similar move within the Eastern Defense Com-
mand made the Third Air Force a training unit under the AAF, while
294