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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E But these officers also pointed out that the War Depart- ment and its subordinate units were not organized in such a way as to promote a maximum integration of effort in the field of radar. Independent analyses by American officials bore out the general verdict rendered by Watson-Watt. Early in February 1942, an Army Air Forces report described the defenses of both the Eastern and Western Defense Commands as “entirely inadequate.” 1 3 3 A special report of mid-February on East Coast defenses indicated that air warn- ing units lacked proper equipment and were manned by poorly trained personnel and that “the only night defense which can be provided by the Interceptor Command consists of single seater aircraft operated by inexperienced personnel in cooperation with antiaircraft search- lights.” la‘ Many important objectives were totally unprotected by pursuit planes, and even the defense of New York City depended on seventeen fighters, eleven of which were obsolete. As late as 1 5 April 1942, Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote to General Arnold of the War Department’s concern over the ineffectiveness of coastal air defenses and cited as disturbing evidence a report which indicated that one-third of all flights in the Eastern Defense Command were recorded as “unidentified.” 135 Strengthening Continental Air Defenses The hard fact was that many of the measures required for an operationally dependable system could not be improvised. It was not until late 1943, in fact, that the continental defense forces were gen- erally equipped with VHF radio and a workable system for control- ling interceptions a t night.13’ But steps taken early in 1942 laid the basis both for a strong continental air defense and-what proved even more significant-for an efficient system for controlling fighters in offensive combat operations. Especially important was the extensive research program undertaken in such centers as the Radiation Labora- tory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, an effort that served ultimately to raise American radar techniques to engineering and tactical levels unequalled by any other nation. Particularly sig- nificant was the development of microwave early warning (MEW) radar.’37 The relative inefficiency of radar in use along the Pacific coast in early 1942 attracted the attention of a University of Cali- fornia physicist, Dr. Luis Alvarez, who became convinced that a giant radar which could scan hundreds of miles and which could give 293
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