“Mission Control”60+ pages
- p. 40 …On recommendation of an American
mission sent to Europe in June under newly commissioned Col.
Raynal…
- p. 50 …a r I1 and its self-
conceived mission can be appreciated only in light of a…
- p. 52 …In the lower grades, where promotion was controlled inexorably
by seniority, Air Service pilots found themselves…
- p. 56 …complete control of the Army and form
an integral part thereof.” Yet the Crowell mission, appointed…
- p. 60 …The Lampert Committee went far beyond
its designated mission, bringing under review the whole province of…
- p. 63 …to it a more or less independent mission. Experi-
ence in World War I seemed to…
- p. 65 …Command respon-
sibility for that mission within the Air Corps devolved upon the Com-
manding General…
- p. 66 …Navy in further-
awe of their respective missions. The Air Corps Tactical School
claimed for air…
- p. 69 …which fights for and gains control of the air,’’ and to calculate
a well-balanced air…
- p. 71 …Mitchell could still believe that “it was an established fact that
the principal mission of an…
- p. 80 …based on the fundamental doctrine that their mission is to aid
the ground forces to gain…
- p. 81 …The mission of the Army was defense of the United States and
its outlying territories, but…
- p. 129 …assigned to the air force an
independent mission of strategic bombing. Accordingly, in March
1918 the…
- p. 155 …By taking
control of French or English colonial possessions, victorious Axis
powers might lodge themselves at…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 235 …Long-standing
differences between the Army and Navy over jurisdictional control of
offshore patrol had brought…
- p. 241 …And because the chain of command in both Pacific areas
and in Washington vested ultimate control…
- p. 270 …Other combat activity by pursuit piiots was
incidental to scheduled reconnaissance missions, as when on I…
- p. 273 …Atlantic and India,” would come under his control at Bangal~re.’~
It soon became evident, however…
- p. 295 …American forces in Burma, and
later in India, had as a primary mission the promotion of…
- p. 306 …The mission of the MAB
was to keep current estimates of U.S.-British munitions resources…
- p. 308 …of a “nucleus of GHQ.” Its original mission was to direct the
training of the tactical…
- p. 314 …The field forces remained under
the control of the General Staff, and the War Plans Division…
- p. 316 …General Arnold’s control of the US. Air Force is as com-
plete, virtually, as is…
- p. 317 …it also made possible a certain indirect
control from Washington through letters written more often in…
- p. 343 …To permit effective control of fighter planes at
night or during bad weather would have required…
- p. 368 …constituted as of 29 May.’l The mission of the new
command was, first, “to move…
- p. 379 …A North
African military mission under Brig. Gen. Russell H. Maxwell had
been established at Cairo…
- p. 397 …In helping to prepare HALPRO for overseas movement by air and
in controlling the flight along…
- p. 412 …to perform a series of remarkable special
missions. Shuttling between Australia, the Philippines, the Nether-
lands…
- p. 426 …formation
of task forces to undertake specific missions, and for their command
he was to designate…
- p. 441 …But of these, four missions
involving a total of seventeen bombers were abortive because of un…
- p. 458 …During
January and February the bomber command dispatched approxi-
mately sixty heavy bomber missions, for a…
- p. 464 …attempting a take-off for yet another mission of relief.’
If the Americans on Bataan and…
- p. 472 …naval control, during which time
six of the planes flew the first American bomber mission against…
- p. 475 …Such missions, however, could be flown only with the greatest
expenditure of time and effort. Until…
- p. 500 …remain in the Far East under the control of General S t i l ~ e l…
- p. 503 …But circumstances beyond the control of the
aircrews were against the flight.
Although a fortuitous and…
- p. 525 …of Midway, nor had it
retained operational control of the few planes actually sent up to…
- p. 527 …If the vulnerable PBY's were shot down while executing their
search mission, this was a…
- p. 549 …those who had flown their first combat mission
in April had to fight a feeling of…
- p. 571 …largest mission to date comprised a total of six bombers-
would remain under theater control but…
- p. 589 …This, the Army felt, might lead ultimately to Navy control of all air
forces. As late…
- p. 620 …At the same time, it initiated projects peculiar to
its own mission and by the end…
- p. 621 …It would
work in conjunction with naval forces and under their operational
control “wherever this may…
- p. 646 …the British
Joint Staff Mission a t Washington, the American Military Mission
at London.” The American…
- p. 647 …General Chaney opened his headquarters in the American Embassy
building on 19 May 1941.'' His mission…
- p. 648 …Air forces would have two missions: to pro-
vide, in certain areas, an “air defense, integrated…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 651 …Military Mission in
London-under direct control of the commanding general of U S .
Field Forces…
- p. 654 …They consider that function their primary mission here and are not
willing to surrender it.1le…
- p. 659 …bombardment missions,
either by direct coverage or by synchronized fighter sweeps. Strategic
control of AAF operations…
- p. 669 …o n ~ . ~ ’ ~Such operations under the RAF control system required
numerous modifications for the plane-about…
- p. 683 …not
be adequate to carry out the mission intended for it under GYM-
NAST. H e…
- p. 684 …T o adapt the Eighth Air Force to its new mission required a con-
siderable reshuffling…
- p. 717 …develop-
ment of adequate machinery for the control of combat operations by
establishing the Provisional I…
- p. 728 …2 , 27 AUGUST 2942
HE Eighth Air Force flew its first mission in an atmosphere
charged…
- p. 730 …in preparation for initial operations under RAF control.
Each of the three squadrons was attached for…
- p. 731 …Policy concerning the pro-
vision and control of fighter escort had not yet been determined,
but…
- p. 735 …Shortly before 1900 hours, watchers on the control tower
spotted a cluster of specks to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
organization applied to technically inadequate equipment used in
exceptionally difficult conditions.” lZ9 Progress would depend upon
giving all levels of command an understanding of the true capabilities
of radar, which, according to the British expert, could be found as a
happy medium between two absurd attitudes, one of which viewed
radar as an all-seeing, omniscient weapon, “a crystal ball on a truck,”
and the other extreme which regarded it as nothing more than a freak
gadget “producing snap observations on targets which may or may
not be aircraft.” Actually, radar, in the hands of trained technicians,
could provide a dependable warning system “in which continuity of
tracking is normal, [and] where the unexplained is rare.” But such
results could be achieved only with close organization and supervision,
a point at which the American warning service fell short.
Equally serious was the problem of equipment. In a report filled
with illuminating detail, the British expert found our seaward recon-
naissance grossly inefficient because of the total lack of ASV equip-
ment and because of the limited number of patrol aircraft of suitable
range. The radar screen along the West Coast was based on too few
stations, and the equipment itself had inherent defects which made it
“gravely unsuitable.” All radar experts were agreed that each set
represented a compromise between a variety of demands, but the prin-
cipal American radar was “unique in combining slow search with
poor cover in elevation, with lack of all facilities for height finding,
and with a grave danger of plotting false tracks.” Moreover, depend-
able employment of this radar had been made even more unlikely
because of a mistake in the selection of sites for its installation. Per-
sonnel to operate the radars had not been carefully selected and were
inadequate both in numbers and in training. The United States was
found to have repeated an early error of Britain in failing to provide
for the training of large numbers of skilled radar technicians.
Officials in Washington accepted the report in the constructive
spirit in which it was offered. The director of Air Defense at AAF
Headquarters concurred in every detail with the findings and called
the study “a damning indictment of our whole warning service.” 1 3 0
H e also expressed the view that the situation on the East Coast was
even worse than the conditions reported along the Pa~ific.’~’The
Chief Signal Officer and the Chief of the Army Air Forces agreed that
the causes of the trouble lay in the lack of time for improvement of
radar equipment and the limitations imposed by considerations of
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