“Headquarters”60+ pages
- p. 5 …With the end of the war, Headquarters approved a plan for
writing and publishing a seven…
- p. 8 …The first hectic months after Pearl
Harbor left little time in a military headquarters for consideration…
- p. 9 …Department calling for the appointment by AAF Headquarters of a
historian in accordance with the President…
- p. 10 …After returning
to Headquarters at the close of 1942, Colonel Williams found the
pressure of a…
- p. 11 …T h e first of those points, of course, was AAF
Headquarters itself. Though the Army…
- p. 12 …But, in developing a system
of historical reporting from other headquarters, the “supporting docu-
ments” received…
- p. 13 …in the hurried atmosphere of a military headquarters, and it depended
for its support upon men…
- p. 14 …In most cases, however, the offer of professional assistance from AAF
Headquarters was welcomed, though occasionally…
- p. 15 …close
of hostilities to bring into AAF Headquarters certain of the field per-
sonnel for the…
- p. 18 …Goss served as historian with the Fourth Air
Force and was subsequently brought into AAF Headquarters…
- p. 19 …Air Service Command,
USSTAF, was assigned to Headquarters, USSTAF.
Finally there remains something to be told…
- p. 21 …Simpson of the Office of
Air Force History, Headquarters, United States Air Force. Colonel
Paul has…
- p. 29 …JAPANESEINSTALLATIONS ON NORTHHEAD,KISKA,JULY1942
HEADQUARTERS,3 STH FIGHTERGROUP,PORT MORESBY,1942
HEADQUARTERS,3 gTH FIGHTERGROUP…
- p. 45 …and his
inspections took him to various headquarters, to depots and airfields,
to-and over-the…
- p. 53 …bulk of offensive air units to General Headquarters.
The War Department resisted in turn every proposal…
- p. 197 …The First Air Force, with headquarters at Mitchel Field, New
York, was acting as a major…
- p. 205 …The
approved peacetime garrisons called for one heavy bombardment
squadron and a group headquarters at Bermuda…
- p. 209 …P-36’s in crates, and the headquarters squadron
of the 28th Composite Group took up…
- p. 210 …Defense
Command, which forwarded the material to headquarters of the
Western Defense Command at San Francisco…
- p. 213 …Martin, was organized tactically
into the 18th Bombardment Wing, with headquarters at Hickam
Field, and the…
- p. 214 …provided the separate squadrons
with an air headquarters. Expansion of the Air Corps brought about
a…
- p. 221 …4th Composite Group, consisted of the
Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, the 3d Pursuit Squadron,
and the…
- p. 222 …AAF Headquarters felt that a striking force of
heavy bombers would be a necessary part of…
- p. 226 …during
a series of conferences at AAF Headquarters in Washington. On 16
November the military air…
- p. 230 …The watchers were
instructed to transmit their observations by telephone or telegraph to
headquarters of the…
- p. 232 …which prevailed over the preference of general
headquarters for a more northern and presumably more secure…
- p. 252 …It would appear that the files of General Headquarters, Southwest
Pacific Area, are also i n…
- p. 254 …to General Headquarters, General
Brereton states that he returned to his own headquarters a t Nielson…
- p. 255 …George, chief of staff, V Interceptor Command, reported
to headquarters “that there are 54 airplanes in…
- p. 257 …The Summary of Activi-
ties for Headquarters, Far East Air Force, notes: “11:56 General
Brereton…
- p. 268 …At I I I 5 , inter-
ceptor headquarters received specific warning of enemy aircraft
approaching from…
- p. 270 …with a tele-
phone line to operations headquarters. Until the Del Monte base could
be greatly…
- p. 272 …O n another
occasion, 2 7th Group headquarters was falsely informed by telephone
that its A…
- p. 275 …two PBY’s to establish a new headquarters in Au~tralia.~’By +he
29th of December…
- p. 281 …mission.” lo*
General Brereton established a temporary headquarters at Darwin.
Though the aim of all operations…
- p. 288 …the air planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the…
- p. 308 …General Headquarters was of recent origin, but the desirability of
such a staff in the event…
- p. 310 …both unit and individual training.88 General Headquarters’
responsibility for air force training was limited to…
- p. 311 …WPD’s judgment that relations
between General Headquarters and the Army Air Forces were “in-
definite…
- p. 312 …Gates.lo7
General Headquarters was not consulted until 5 February, but Gen-
eral McNair had long…
- p. 315 …In reality the influence of AAF Headquarters on the actual conduct
of the war went far…
- p. 344 …The director of Air Defense at AAF
Headquarters concurred in every detail with the findings and…
- p. 346 …With its headquarters a t San Francisco, the command
included an extensive area of nine western…
- p. 378 …The headquarters was
established a t the main base a t Accra on 8 October 1941…
- p. 400 …Here, in January 1942, the headquarters
of the newly activated North Atlantic Sector of the Ferrying…
- p. 405 …into the bases.‘38
Army Air Forces Headquarters, the Ferrying Command, and other
interested AAF agencies…
- p. 425 …was to be maintained
between all major headquarters, logistical facilities would be shared,
and local commanders…
- p. 426 …O n 18 January, he located his headquarters at Lembang, ten miles north of
Bandoeng in…
- p. 434 …the United
States and it was the headquarters of USAFIA, whose responsibility in
January became chiefly…
- p. 435 …the 2 I st Air Flotilla and headquarters detach-
ments-moved to Davao during the first…
- p. 442 …officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash-
ington throughout January. Australian and Dutch forces were…
- p. 445 …organization, but co-ordination between its own
headquarters and the Dutch interceptor control remained imperfect.
T…
- p. 454 …In Java, General Wavell closed his personal headquarters on 2 5 Feb-
ruary, at which time…
- p. 462 …Final Efforts in the Philippines
When General Brereton’s headquarters had been moved to Austra-
lia…
- p. 482 …He proposed the establishment of
air headquarters in each defensive area, prepared to accept and operate…
- p. 486 …AAF Headquarters had been prompt to recognize the need
for properly equipped photographic squadrons, and shortly…
- p. 491 …In fact, A-3 of AAF Headquarters already had prepared a squadron,
the 68th, which was…
- p. 517 …Emmons, commanding the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, appealed to AAF Headquarters for additional planes, and these
were…
- p. 546 HEADQUARTERS, 3STH FIGHTER GROUP, PORT MORESBY, 1942
- p. 547 HEADQUARTERS, 35TH FIGHTER GROUP, PORT MORESBY, 1942
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
organization applied to technically inadequate equipment used in
exceptionally difficult conditions.” lZ9 Progress would depend upon
giving all levels of command an understanding of the true capabilities
of radar, which, according to the British expert, could be found as a
happy medium between two absurd attitudes, one of which viewed
radar as an all-seeing, omniscient weapon, “a crystal ball on a truck,”
and the other extreme which regarded it as nothing more than a freak
gadget “producing snap observations on targets which may or may
not be aircraft.” Actually, radar, in the hands of trained technicians,
could provide a dependable warning system “in which continuity of
tracking is normal, [and] where the unexplained is rare.” But such
results could be achieved only with close organization and supervision,
a point at which the American warning service fell short.
Equally serious was the problem of equipment. In a report filled
with illuminating detail, the British expert found our seaward recon-
naissance grossly inefficient because of the total lack of ASV equip-
ment and because of the limited number of patrol aircraft of suitable
range. The radar screen along the West Coast was based on too few
stations, and the equipment itself had inherent defects which made it
“gravely unsuitable.” All radar experts were agreed that each set
represented a compromise between a variety of demands, but the prin-
cipal American radar was “unique in combining slow search with
poor cover in elevation, with lack of all facilities for height finding,
and with a grave danger of plotting false tracks.” Moreover, depend-
able employment of this radar had been made even more unlikely
because of a mistake in the selection of sites for its installation. Per-
sonnel to operate the radars had not been carefully selected and were
inadequate both in numbers and in training. The United States was
found to have repeated an early error of Britain in failing to provide
for the training of large numbers of skilled radar technicians.
Officials in Washington accepted the report in the constructive
spirit in which it was offered. The director of Air Defense at AAF
Headquarters concurred in every detail with the findings and called
the study “a damning indictment of our whole warning service.” 1 3 0
H e also expressed the view that the situation on the East Coast was
even worse than the conditions reported along the Pa~ific.’~’The
Chief Signal Officer and the Chief of the Army Air Forces agreed that
the causes of the trouble lay in the lack of time for improvement of
radar equipment and the limitations imposed by considerations of
2 9 2