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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Independence Day”9 pages
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E radar coverage was supplemented on the East Coast by approximately 4,000 ground observer stations and along the Pacific by an additional 2,~+00.‘~~Reports from ground observers had to be processed through filter and information centers, both of which required the services of large numbers of volunteer workers. The interceptor commands had managed to expedite the construction of the basic elements of this complex system, but there had not been time to recruit and train all the personnel required to operate it. Moreover, the network, even when placed in perfect readiness, could have met only the primary need of early warning. To permit effective control of fighter planes at night or during bad weather would have required the addition of mobile units equipped with the newer radar aids developed in Britain.lZ4But in December 1941the United States had no radar equip- ment comparable to the GCI set of Britain, and fighter planes in this country were still using high frequency-rather than VHF-radio sets. Airborne radar for night fighters was lacking, as was the identifi- cation equipment required to distinguish friendly from hostile ~ 1 a n e s . l ~ ~Not a single airplane stationed on the Pacific coast was equipped with ASV radar,lZ6with the result that crews of patrol bombers were entirely dependent on visual detection and could oper- ate only during daylight hours and when visibility was good. In providing a remedy for the recognized deficiencies of the Amer- ican warning service, the War Department once again was able to draw on the experience of Britain. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, a t the suggestion of the United States military mission in London, the RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific Advisor on Telecommunications to the Air Ministry.’” His presence in the United States might serve, the British agreed, to “increase the scope and operational efficiency” of American radar and would be in line with Anglo-American efforts to “make the best common use of tech- nical personnel and materiel.” * 2 8 Accordingly, Watson-Watt arrived in the United States before the end of December 1941for the purpose of undertaking a detailed analysis of the peculiar problems of Ameri- can air defense. Any vestiges of complacency as to the adequacy of the American aircraft warning service which may have remained in War Depart- ment circles were destroyed by the severely critical report made by Watson-Watt in January 1942 of the air defenses on the West Coast. Dangerously unsatisfactory conditions existed, reflecting “insufficient 2 9 1
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