“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E
Controllers were thus able to issue instructions to their pilots and to
guide them into contact with hostile planes. The ground-to-air instruc-
tions were sent by means of a new type of VHF (very high fre-
quency) radio equipment, which was greatly superior to the high
frequency radios then in use in the US. Army.lo8The VHF command
set permitted controllers to maneuver friendly fighters to a point about
one or two miles from an enemy plane and to guide them back to their
base a t the end of the fight. But to achieve interceptions at night, it
was necessary for a pilot to get his plane "on the very tail" of his
target. The British solved this problem by the development of a new
radar called A1 (airborne interception). By switching on this equip-
ment, a radar operator in a British plane could guide his pilot to a
point a few hundred yards from a Nazi raider.lo8 One collateral
development of the British deserves mention because of its great sig-
nificance for the United States. This was ASV radar (air to surface
vessel) airborne equipment which enabled a patrol plane to detect
ships a t distances up to fifty miles."O Offshore patrols using ASV
radar greatly enlarged the early warning coverage of coastal radars,
and in addition this equipment became a weapon of vital importance
in the war against Axis submarines.
Through prewar years the United States had not kept pace with
Britain in radar developments. The Air Corps and the Coast Artillery
had supported the efforts of the Signal Corps to perfect early warning
devices, but the Army lacked both the funds and the manpower to
undertake a large-scale development of radar equipment.'ll By the
fall of 1939, the American Army had only an experimental installa-
tion a t Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.*12 In November of that year,
General Arnold directed the War Department's attention to the lack
of a national air defense system, and strongly urged that a unit be
established to study the pr0b1em.l'~ The result was the creation on 26
February 1940of the Air Defense Command for the conduct of experi-
ments in the northeastern states to determine how fighter planes, anti-
aircraft artillery, and an air warning system could be integrated into
a single defense network.' In its efforts, the command enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those attained in actual combat. Moreover, Anglo-
American co-operation now extended to mutual exchange of technical
eq~ipment."~The United States began to receive information on air-
* See above, pp. 152-53.
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