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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E Controllers were thus able to issue instructions to their pilots and to guide them into contact with hostile planes. The ground-to-air instruc- tions were sent by means of a new type of VHF (very high fre- quency) radio equipment, which was greatly superior to the high frequency radios then in use in the US. Army.lo8The VHF command set permitted controllers to maneuver friendly fighters to a point about one or two miles from an enemy plane and to guide them back to their base a t the end of the fight. But to achieve interceptions at night, it was necessary for a pilot to get his plane "on the very tail" of his target. The British solved this problem by the development of a new radar called A1 (airborne interception). By switching on this equip- ment, a radar operator in a British plane could guide his pilot to a point a few hundred yards from a Nazi raider.lo8 One collateral development of the British deserves mention because of its great sig- nificance for the United States. This was ASV radar (air to surface vessel) airborne equipment which enabled a patrol plane to detect ships a t distances up to fifty miles."O Offshore patrols using ASV radar greatly enlarged the early warning coverage of coastal radars, and in addition this equipment became a weapon of vital importance in the war against Axis submarines. Through prewar years the United States had not kept pace with Britain in radar developments. The Air Corps and the Coast Artillery had supported the efforts of the Signal Corps to perfect early warning devices, but the Army lacked both the funds and the manpower to undertake a large-scale development of radar equipment.'ll By the fall of 1939, the American Army had only an experimental installa- tion a t Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.*12 In November of that year, General Arnold directed the War Department's attention to the lack of a national air defense system, and strongly urged that a unit be established to study the pr0b1em.l'~ The result was the creation on 26 February 1940of the Air Defense Command for the conduct of experi- ments in the northeastern states to determine how fighter planes, anti- aircraft artillery, and an air warning system could be integrated into a single defense network.' In its efforts, the command enjoyed through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com- pare results with those attained in actual combat. Moreover, Anglo- American co-operation now extended to mutual exchange of technical eq~ipment."~The United States began to receive information on air- * See above, pp. 152-53. 2 8 9
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