Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E
soon defined the elements which would be required in a defense sys-
tem. It would be necessary to know in advance of the approach of
enemy craft. Next, there would have to be some method for con-
tinuous tracking of the planes as they came toward their objective, and
this would require some device to supply information regarding the
height, direction, speed, and approximate size of a raiding force.
Finally, there would need to be some system for identifying friendly
fighters and of communicating to their pilots the information gathered
on the movement of enemy planes. Given all these elements, a com-
mander on the ground might then control the interception and bring
friendly fighters into contact with any large attacking force. Such a
system might not prevent an occasional raider from breaking through,
but it would make it possible to limit the advantage of complete sur-
prise which some students of the problem thought the airplane would
always enjoy.
With the technical equipment which existed in 1918, no adequate
defense against air raids was possible, but attempts to perfect new
devices occupied much of the time of military planners through the
two decades between World Wars I and 11.'' T h e first detectors used
such equipment as parabolic reflectors to pick up the sound of an on-
coming plane, but results were so poor that the United States Army in
1933 abandoned research in the field of auditory detection.lo0Several
other lines of investigation, notably in the possibility of using infrared
heat waves, attracted attention, but ultimately interest came to be
centered in discovery of a more exact method of detection by use of
radio waves. A t first, ordinary radio waves were employed; but severe
technical limitations were encountered, and the true origins of modern
military radar-"radio detection and ranging"-dated from I 93 5, when
practical microwave radio sets were developed. Four basic steps were
involved in the improvements which gave radar its great military sig-
nificance: the discovery that radio energy of very high frequency
was reflected by objects in its path rather than being absorbed as was
the case with waves of lower frequency; the development of a trans-
mitter to emit pulses of radio energy in a sharply defined directional
beam, which, with allowance of a time lapse between emissions, per-
mitted a receiver to pick up the energy reflected from the target; the
perfection of a cathode ray tube, or oscilloscope, on which the small
time lapse between the outgoing pulse and the reflected image could
be measured; and, finally, the invention of the cavity magnetron tube,
2 8 7

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.