“The Advance”60+ pages
- p. 14 …But the final choice remained with the commanding general,
who in some instances moved in advance…
- p. 36 …sufficiently advanced to support limited offensives in both the
European and the Pacific theaters.
The history…
- p. 40 …Advanced training was for the most part scheduled for overseas
schools, where combat experience of the…
- p. 43 …Of 2 , 9 2 5 planes reaching the AEF’s Zone of
Advance during the war…
- p. 45 …Trenchard, then com-
mander of the Royal Flying Corps, and was profoundly impressed by
his advanced…
- p. 46 …the Zone of Advance,
the I Corps, the First Army, and the First Army Group, advancing…
- p. 47 …The rest of his offensive forces Mitchell concentrated along the axis
of the American advance. Since…
- p. 51 …among
the several armies.’ Aviation officers had to accept this concept, but
the most advanced thought…
- p. 63 …Its report in October 1933 did not accept the more advanced
ideas of the Army’s…
- p. 68 …on the details of aerial combat, they
seldom represent the most advanced thought within the Army…
- p. 70 …to have been geared
closely to the advance of the ground armies. His boldest plan, a…
- p. 71 …the field of battle of either armies or navies.“
But this unpleasant thought was advanced as…
- p. 76 …who might provide
advanced bases. H e had come to consider that “the basis of air…
- p. 87 …the doctrine of air war taught in the Air
Corps’ most advanced school a t the…
- p. 88 …One was the acquisition of more advanced bases. That
was a political matter, wholly foreign to…
- p. 91 …the years immediately follow-
ing the war, when as yet commercial aviation had not advanced to…
- p. 93 …the quest for cleaner lines the retractable landing
gear had been introduced.lG8If the advances made…
- p. 96 …mission of
coastal defense and that the proposal was advanced under circum-
stances decidedly favorable to…
- p. 112 …Numerous forecasts of such a development had been
voiced since the end of the earlier conflict…
- p. 117 …In contrast to the 2 0 0 hours in primary, basic, and advanced training
then being…
- p. 119 …in the organization of their air
forces the Italians were much further advanced than the Japanese…
- p. 122 …Force, the aviation department sought to promote the
growth of “civilian” airlines, the advancement of aeronautical…
- p. 125 …Though the Luftwaff e hardly proved
to be so overwhelming a force as its advance notices…
- p. 126 …The Lufnvaffe was used both to eliminate the air opposition and as
an advance striking force…
- p. 127 …Leading the rapidly advancing Panzer divisions through the Low
Countries, the Stukas bombed troop concentrations and…
- p. 129 …supply resulting from the
speed of the German advance, the success of the RAF at Dunkirk…
- p. 131 …By the summer of 1940 the breath-taking advance of German
forces had destroyed all effective…
- p. 134 …After seizing key airdromes, the advance German forces
were supplied and reinforced by Junkers 5 2…
- p. 135 …In addition, the rapid German advance dis-
rupted the air supply and maintenance system and a…
- p. 149 …the best
flying weather and each including a number, steadily growing, of
basic and advanced Responsibility…
- p. 161 …miles to the
That attack argued too for the next eastward advance of the Ameri-
can…
- p. 164 …islands, proved inadequate against the
Japanese surprise attacks, but the advanced island airstrips were to be…
- p. 165 …the United States and Alaska. And, as elsewhere,
protection of Alaska called for more advanced outposts…
- p. 170 …New estimates, submitted in &/lay by the W a r Plans Division
of the General Staff…
- p. 183 …T h e
British chiefs of staff did not envisage the use of the vast numbers…
- p. 198 …so far advanced as
those in Newfoundland. Surveys which were made during the spring
and summer…
- p. 201 …32
The organization of the Caribbean Air Force represented a marked
structural advance over the force…
- p. 204 …Of the several outlying sites in the eastern Caribbean, Puerto Rico
presented the most advanced stage…
- p. 211 …advanced bases, a series of inter-
mediate airfields, a chain of fields between Anchorage and the…
- p. 213 …the requirements for accommodating a pursuit group in the same
area.51These moves had not advanced…
- p. 217 …of the Navy to maintain
the long-range reconnaissance that would be required for advance
notice…
- p. 226 …The Interceptor Command was composed of the 24th Pursuit Group,
whose pilots had received advanced training…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 251 …execution of the plan for an early morning attack, and gave the
Americans advance notice of…
- p. 253 …mission without advance reconnaissance. T h e interview did
not indicate whether the question of an…
- p. 274 …the steady advance of the enemy from the north and addi-
tional landings along the Luzon…
- p. 278 …in advance of the scheduled
date of 15 January. Both the Army and the Navy were…
- p. 281 …and the disposition of Air Corps troops
in advance thereof in order to accomplish your assigned…
- p. 282 …Shanghai to acquire
advanced bases; (b) by exerting slow pressure through the Nether-
lands East Indies…
- p. 291 …These problems were intimately related, and any ready solu-
tion was complicated by the whirlwind advance…
- p. 327 …than “a cadre sent to the territory in
advance of the main body.” 32 T o…
- p. 334 …the War Department version of the incident, and he advanced two
theories to account for the…
- p. 335 …between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the Army…
- p. 337 …It would be necessary to know in advance of the approach of
enemy craft. Next, there…
- p. 338 …time proved less
effective,lo4 for advance warning of the enemy's approach did little
good…
- p. 350 …the Pacific coast defense
zone, arrangements had been completed with the Canadians to provide
advance warning…
- p. 358 …Prospects for completing the
work in advance of an anticipated spring attack on Dutch Harbor
were…
- p. 397 …his staff to work out in advance details for the staging
+ See below, p. 493.
34'
- p. 399 …an advance task force of engineer, coast artillery, and general
service troops arrived in the waters…
- p. 403 …T e n
enlisted weather specialists accompanied the American advance task
force into southern Greenland in…
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E
T h e divergence of views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the Army to explain the
affair, touched off a vigorous public discussion. The Los Angeles
Times,in a first-page editorial on 2 6 February, announced that “the
considerable public excitement and confusion” caused by the alert, as
well as its “spectacular official accompaniments,” demanded a careful
explanation. Fears were expressed lest a few phony raids undermine
the confidence of civilian volunteers in the aircraft warning service.
In Congress, Representative Leland Ford wanted to know whether
the incident was “a practice raid, or a raid to throw a scare into
2,000,000 people, or a mistaken identity raid, or a raid to take away
Southern California’s war industries.” 87 Wendell Willkie, speaking in
Los Angeles on 2 6 February, assured Californians on the basis of his
experiences in England that when a real air raid began “you won’t
have to argue about it-you’ll just know.” 8 8 He conceded that military
authorities had been correct in calling a precautionary alert but
deplored the lack of agreement between the Army and Navy. A strong
editorial in the Washington Post on 27 February called the handling
of the Los Angeles episode a “recipe for jitters,” and censured the
military authorities for what it called “stubborn silence” in the face of
widespread uncertainty. The editorial suggested that the Army’s
theory that commercial planes might have caused the alert “explains
everything except where the planes came from, whither they were
going, and why no American planes were sent in pursuit of them.” 89
The New York Times on 2 8 February expressed a belief that the more
the incident was studied, the more incredible it became: “If the bat-
teries were firing on nothing at all, as Secretary Knox implies, it is a
sign of expensive incompetence and jitters. If the batteries were firing
on real planes, some of them as low as 9,000 feet, as Secretary Stimson
declares, why were they completely ineffective? W h y did no Amer-
ican planes go up to engage them, or even to identify them? . . .
What would have happened if this had been a real air raid?” These
questions were appropriate, but for the War Department to have
answered them in full frankness would have involved an even more
complete revelation of the weakness of our air defenses.
At the end of the war, the Japanese stated that they did not send
planes over the area at the time of this alert,’l although submarine-
launched aircraft were subsequently used over Seattle.82 A careful
study of the evidence suggests that meteorological balloons-known
2 8 5