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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Indian Air Force”11 pages
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E T h e divergence of views between the W a r and Navy departments, and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the Army to explain the affair, touched off a vigorous public discussion. The Los Angeles Times,in a first-page editorial on 2 6 February, announced that “the considerable public excitement and confusion” caused by the alert, as well as its “spectacular official accompaniments,” demanded a careful explanation. Fears were expressed lest a few phony raids undermine the confidence of civilian volunteers in the aircraft warning service. In Congress, Representative Leland Ford wanted to know whether the incident was “a practice raid, or a raid to throw a scare into 2,000,000 people, or a mistaken identity raid, or a raid to take away Southern California’s war industries.” 87 Wendell Willkie, speaking in Los Angeles on 2 6 February, assured Californians on the basis of his experiences in England that when a real air raid began “you won’t have to argue about it-you’ll just know.” 8 8 He conceded that military authorities had been correct in calling a precautionary alert but deplored the lack of agreement between the Army and Navy. A strong editorial in the Washington Post on 27 February called the handling of the Los Angeles episode a “recipe for jitters,” and censured the military authorities for what it called “stubborn silence” in the face of widespread uncertainty. The editorial suggested that the Army’s theory that commercial planes might have caused the alert “explains everything except where the planes came from, whither they were going, and why no American planes were sent in pursuit of them.” 89 The New York Times on 2 8 February expressed a belief that the more the incident was studied, the more incredible it became: “If the bat- teries were firing on nothing at all, as Secretary Knox implies, it is a sign of expensive incompetence and jitters. If the batteries were firing on real planes, some of them as low as 9,000 feet, as Secretary Stimson declares, why were they completely ineffective? W h y did no Amer- ican planes go up to engage them, or even to identify them? . . . What would have happened if this had been a real air raid?” These questions were appropriate, but for the War Department to have answered them in full frankness would have involved an even more complete revelation of the weakness of our air defenses. At the end of the war, the Japanese stated that they did not send planes over the area at the time of this alert,’l although submarine- launched aircraft were subsequently used over Seattle.82 A careful study of the evidence suggests that meteorological balloons-known 2 8 5
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