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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
varied from “very slow” to over zoo miles per hour, were observed to
parade across the ~kies.‘~These mysterious forces dropped no bombs
and, despite the fact that 1,440rounds of antiaircraft ammunition were
directed against them, suffered no losses. There were reports, to be
sure, that four enemy planes had been shot down, and one was sup-
posed to have landed in flames a t a Hollywood intersection.80 Resi-
dents in a forty-mile arc along the coast watched from hills or rooftops
as the play of guns and searchlights provided the first real drama of
the war for citizens of the mainland. The dawn, which ended the
shooting and the fantasy, also proved that the only damage which
resulted to the city was such as had been caused by the excitement
(there was at least one death from heart failure), by traffic accidents
in the blacked-out streets, or by shell fragments from the artillery
barrage.81
Attempts to arrive at an explanation of the incident quickly became
as involved and mysterious as the “battle” itself. The Navy immedi-
ately insisted that there was no evidence of the presence of enemy
planes, and Secretary Knox announced at a press conference on 2 5
February that the raid was just a false At the same conference
he admitted that attacks were always possible and indicated that vital
industries located along the coast ought to be moved inland. The Army
had a hard time making up its mind on the cause of the alert. A report
to Washington, made by the Western Defense Command shortly after
the raid had ended, indicated that the credibility of reports of an attack
had begun to be shaken before the blackout was lifted. This message
predicted that developments would prove “that most previous reports
had been greatly exaggerated.” 8 3 The Fourth Air Force had indicated
its belief that there were no planes over Los Angeles. But the Army
did not publish these initial conclusions. Instead, it waited a day, until
after a thorough examination of witnesses had been fini~hed.~”On the
basis of these hearings, local commanders altered their verdict and
indicated a belief that from one to five unidentified airplanes had been
over Los A n g e l e ~ . ~ ~Secretary Stimson announced this conclusion as
the War Department version of the incident, and he advanced two
theories to account for the mysterious craft: either they were commer-
cial planes operated by an enemy from secret fields in California or
Mexico, or they were light planes launched from Japanese sub-
marines.86In either case, the enemy’s purpose must have been to locate
antiaircraft defenses in the area or to deliver a blow at civilian morale.
284

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.