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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
varied from “very slow” to over zoo miles per hour, were observed to
parade across the ~kies.‘~These mysterious forces dropped no bombs
and, despite the fact that 1,440rounds of antiaircraft ammunition were
directed against them, suffered no losses. There were reports, to be
sure, that four enemy planes had been shot down, and one was sup-
posed to have landed in flames a t a Hollywood intersection.80 Resi-
dents in a forty-mile arc along the coast watched from hills or rooftops
as the play of guns and searchlights provided the first real drama of
the war for citizens of the mainland. The dawn, which ended the
shooting and the fantasy, also proved that the only damage which
resulted to the city was such as had been caused by the excitement
(there was at least one death from heart failure), by traffic accidents
in the blacked-out streets, or by shell fragments from the artillery
barrage.81
Attempts to arrive at an explanation of the incident quickly became
as involved and mysterious as the “battle” itself. The Navy immedi-
ately insisted that there was no evidence of the presence of enemy
planes, and Secretary Knox announced at a press conference on 2 5
February that the raid was just a false At the same conference
he admitted that attacks were always possible and indicated that vital
industries located along the coast ought to be moved inland. The Army
had a hard time making up its mind on the cause of the alert. A report
to Washington, made by the Western Defense Command shortly after
the raid had ended, indicated that the credibility of reports of an attack
had begun to be shaken before the blackout was lifted. This message
predicted that developments would prove “that most previous reports
had been greatly exaggerated.” 8 3 The Fourth Air Force had indicated
its belief that there were no planes over Los Angeles. But the Army
did not publish these initial conclusions. Instead, it waited a day, until
after a thorough examination of witnesses had been fini~hed.~”On the
basis of these hearings, local commanders altered their verdict and
indicated a belief that from one to five unidentified airplanes had been
over Los A n g e l e ~ . ~ ~Secretary Stimson announced this conclusion as
the War Department version of the incident, and he advanced two
theories to account for the mysterious craft: either they were commer-
cial planes operated by an enemy from secret fields in California or
Mexico, or they were light planes launched from Japanese sub-
marines.86In either case, the enemy’s purpose must have been to locate
antiaircraft defenses in the area or to deliver a blow at civilian morale.
284

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.