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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E
resulted from their belief that such a raid as this would be employed
by the enemy to divert attention from a major air task force which
would hurl its planes against a really significant target. Loyal Japanese-
Americans who had predicted that a demonstration would be made in
connection with the President’s speech also prophesied that Los
Angeles would be attacked the next night.’4 The Army, too, was con-
vinced that some new action impended, and took all possible precau-
tions. Newspapers were permitted to announce that a strict state of
readiness against renewed attacks had been imposed,75and there fol-
lowed the confused action known as “the Battle of Los Angeles.”
During the night of 24/25 February 1942, unidentified objects
caused a succession of alerts in southern California. On the 24tl1, a
warning issued by naval intelligence indicated that an attack could be
expected within the next ten hours.76That evening a large number of
flares and blinking lights were reported from the vicinity of defense
plants. An alert called a t I 9 I 8 was lifted a t 2 2 2 3 , and the tension tem-
porarily relaxed. But early in the morning of the 25th renewed activity
began. Radars picked up an unidentified target 1 2 0 miles west of Los
Angeles. Antiaircraft batteries were alerted a t 02 I 5 and were put on
Green Alert-ready to fire-a few minutes later. The AAF kept its
pursuit planes on the ground, preferring to await indications of the
scale and direction of any attack before committing its limited fighter
f o r ~ e . ~ ’Radars tracked the approaching target to within a few miles
of the coast, and a t 0 2 2 I the regional controller ordered a blacko~t.~’
Thereafter the information center was flooded with reports of “enemy
planes,” even though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4 3 , planes were reported near Long Beach,
and a few minutes later a coast artillery colonel spotted “about 2 5
planes at IZ,OOO feet” over Los Angeles. At 0306 a balloon carrying .a
red flare was seen over Santa Monica and four batteries of antiaircraft
artillery opened fire, whereupon “the air over Los Angeles erupted
like a volcano.” From this point on reports were hopelessly a t variance.
Probably much of the confusion came from the fact that antiaircraft
shell bursts, caught by the searchlights, were themselves mistaken for
enemy planes. In any case, the next three hours produced some of the
most imaginative reporting of the war: “swarms” of planes (or, some-
times, balloons) of all possible sizes, numbering from one to several
hundred, traveling at altitudes which ranged from a few thousand
feet to more than to,ooo and flying a t speeds which were said to have
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