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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E
resulted from their belief that such a raid as this would be employed
by the enemy to divert attention from a major air task force which
would hurl its planes against a really significant target. Loyal Japanese-
Americans who had predicted that a demonstration would be made in
connection with the President’s speech also prophesied that Los
Angeles would be attacked the next night.’4 The Army, too, was con-
vinced that some new action impended, and took all possible precau-
tions. Newspapers were permitted to announce that a strict state of
readiness against renewed attacks had been imposed,75and there fol-
lowed the confused action known as “the Battle of Los Angeles.”
During the night of 24/25 February 1942, unidentified objects
caused a succession of alerts in southern California. On the 24tl1, a
warning issued by naval intelligence indicated that an attack could be
expected within the next ten hours.76That evening a large number of
flares and blinking lights were reported from the vicinity of defense
plants. An alert called a t I 9 I 8 was lifted a t 2 2 2 3 , and the tension tem-
porarily relaxed. But early in the morning of the 25th renewed activity
began. Radars picked up an unidentified target 1 2 0 miles west of Los
Angeles. Antiaircraft batteries were alerted a t 02 I 5 and were put on
Green Alert-ready to fire-a few minutes later. The AAF kept its
pursuit planes on the ground, preferring to await indications of the
scale and direction of any attack before committing its limited fighter
f o r ~ e . ~ ’Radars tracked the approaching target to within a few miles
of the coast, and a t 0 2 2 I the regional controller ordered a blacko~t.~’
Thereafter the information center was flooded with reports of “enemy
planes,” even though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems
to have vanished. At 0 2 4 3 , planes were reported near Long Beach,
and a few minutes later a coast artillery colonel spotted “about 2 5
planes at IZ,OOO feet” over Los Angeles. At 0306 a balloon carrying .a
red flare was seen over Santa Monica and four batteries of antiaircraft
artillery opened fire, whereupon “the air over Los Angeles erupted
like a volcano.” From this point on reports were hopelessly a t variance.
Probably much of the confusion came from the fact that antiaircraft
shell bursts, caught by the searchlights, were themselves mistaken for
enemy planes. In any case, the next three hours produced some of the
most imaginative reporting of the war: “swarms” of planes (or, some-
times, balloons) of all possible sizes, numbering from one to several
hundred, traveling at altitudes which ranged from a few thousand
feet to more than to,ooo and flying a t speeds which were said to have
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.