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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I1
shore exploded the next day, killing four men.64Attempts by Army
planes to bomb the submarine were apparently unsuccessful. In any
case, the air patrols were powerless to prevent a second attack on
Aruba on 19 February 6 5 and additional nuisance shellings of shore
installations in Puerto Rico on 2 March 1942 “ and of a refinery on
CuraGao on 19 April.67
The initial attack on Aruba prompted President Roosevelt to warn
the nation that enemy ships could shell New York City, or enemy
planes drop bombs on Detroit.68 Secretary Stimson added that the
public might as well prepare itself to accept “occasional blows,”
because the Army was determined not to disperse its forces in small
fragments to serve as security garrison^.^^ The New York Times, in
an editorial on 2 0 February, pointed out that American seaboard cities
were well within the enemy’s reach, but that the only danger was that
attacks might create a popular demand for protection at all costs. The
real need, it was suggested, was for the perfection of the defense
machinery already in e~istence.~’This raised the question of the
adequacy of the national air defenses; a few days later, events along
the West Coast provided a not too reassuring answer.
During the course of a fireside report to the nation delivered by
President Roosevelt on 2 3 February 1942, a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast north of
Santa Barbara, and pumped thirteen shells into tidewater refinery
installations. The shots seemed designed to punctuate the President’s
statement that “the broad oceans which have been heralded in the past
as our protection from attack have become endless battlefields on
which we are constantly being challenged by our enemies.” “ Yet the
attack which was supposed to carry the enemy’s defiance, and which
did succeed in stealing headlines from the President’s address, was a
feeble gesture rather than a damaging blow. The raider surfaced at
1905 (Pacific time), just five minutes after the President started his
~peech.~’For about twenty minutes the submarine kept a position
2,500 yards offshore to deliver the shots from its 5S-inch guns. The
shells did minor damage to piers and oil wells, but missed the gasoline
plant, which appears to have been the aiming point; the military effects
of the raid were therefore nil. The first news of the attack led to the
dispatch of pursuit planes to the area, and subsequently three bombers
joined the attempt to destroy the raider, but without success.73The
reluctance of AAF commanders to assign larger forces to the task
2 82

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.