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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I1
shore exploded the next day, killing four men.64Attempts by Army
planes to bomb the submarine were apparently unsuccessful. In any
case, the air patrols were powerless to prevent a second attack on
Aruba on 19 February 6 5 and additional nuisance shellings of shore
installations in Puerto Rico on 2 March 1942 “ and of a refinery on
CuraGao on 19 April.67
The initial attack on Aruba prompted President Roosevelt to warn
the nation that enemy ships could shell New York City, or enemy
planes drop bombs on Detroit.68 Secretary Stimson added that the
public might as well prepare itself to accept “occasional blows,”
because the Army was determined not to disperse its forces in small
fragments to serve as security garrison^.^^ The New York Times, in
an editorial on 2 0 February, pointed out that American seaboard cities
were well within the enemy’s reach, but that the only danger was that
attacks might create a popular demand for protection at all costs. The
real need, it was suggested, was for the perfection of the defense
machinery already in e~istence.~’This raised the question of the
adequacy of the national air defenses; a few days later, events along
the West Coast provided a not too reassuring answer.
During the course of a fireside report to the nation delivered by
President Roosevelt on 2 3 February 1942, a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast north of
Santa Barbara, and pumped thirteen shells into tidewater refinery
installations. The shots seemed designed to punctuate the President’s
statement that “the broad oceans which have been heralded in the past
as our protection from attack have become endless battlefields on
which we are constantly being challenged by our enemies.” “ Yet the
attack which was supposed to carry the enemy’s defiance, and which
did succeed in stealing headlines from the President’s address, was a
feeble gesture rather than a damaging blow. The raider surfaced at
1905 (Pacific time), just five minutes after the President started his
~peech.~’For about twenty minutes the submarine kept a position
2,500 yards offshore to deliver the shots from its 5S-inch guns. The
shells did minor damage to piers and oil wells, but missed the gasoline
plant, which appears to have been the aiming point; the military effects
of the raid were therefore nil. The first news of the attack led to the
dispatch of pursuit planes to the area, and subsequently three bombers
joined the attempt to destroy the raider, but without success.73The
reluctance of AAF commanders to assign larger forces to the task
2 82

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.