Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to “sweep the Germans from the sky…
  • p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with the ambitious idens of air power which…
  • p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was never equipped during…
  • p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are you in the Army or the Corps…
  • p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
  • p. 69 …But one axiom, with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never- theless left an open question as to how…
  • p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300 aircraft a month. The pattern of…
  • p. 122 …the German Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in the…
  • p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French factories, the force had never been employed in a…
  • p. 140 …into a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands of our own forces…
  • p. 150 …Long-term needs of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities never…
  • p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
  • p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
  • p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never- theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
  • p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
  • p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points have never been satisfactorily explained. T h e general pattern…
  • p. 277 …motors, sole- noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit- less search…
  • p. 288 …planners and from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate. The translation of the accepted grand…
  • p. 303 …the principal features of the plan were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
  • p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
  • p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
  • p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
  • p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
  • p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
  • p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
  • p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been accomplished, yet now it…
  • p. 509 …Island, in the Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May the two…
  • p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the aircrews, for on the operational level…
  • p. 524 …handicaps under which AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
  • p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that proper observance of economy of force would never…
  • p. 531 …Crews which had previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these weapons into…
  • p. 544 …But the Japanese never at any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
  • p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into All told, the record…
  • p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com- mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
  • p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
  • p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
  • p. 614 …that reason deserving a high priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
  • p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign- ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
  • p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
  • p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England, nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
  • p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never before equaled by the military forces of two…
  • p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I1
shore exploded the next day, killing four men.64Attempts by Army
planes to bomb the submarine were apparently unsuccessful. In any
case, the air patrols were powerless to prevent a second attack on
Aruba on 19 February 6 5 and additional nuisance shellings of shore
installations in Puerto Rico on 2 March 1942 “ and of a refinery on
CuraGao on 19 April.67
The initial attack on Aruba prompted President Roosevelt to warn
the nation that enemy ships could shell New York City, or enemy
planes drop bombs on Detroit.68 Secretary Stimson added that the
public might as well prepare itself to accept “occasional blows,”
because the Army was determined not to disperse its forces in small
fragments to serve as security garrison^.^^ The New York Times, in
an editorial on 2 0 February, pointed out that American seaboard cities
were well within the enemy’s reach, but that the only danger was that
attacks might create a popular demand for protection at all costs. The
real need, it was suggested, was for the perfection of the defense
machinery already in e~istence.~’This raised the question of the
adequacy of the national air defenses; a few days later, events along
the West Coast provided a not too reassuring answer.
During the course of a fireside report to the nation delivered by
President Roosevelt on 2 3 February 1942, a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast north of
Santa Barbara, and pumped thirteen shells into tidewater refinery
installations. The shots seemed designed to punctuate the President’s
statement that “the broad oceans which have been heralded in the past
as our protection from attack have become endless battlefields on
which we are constantly being challenged by our enemies.” “ Yet the
attack which was supposed to carry the enemy’s defiance, and which
did succeed in stealing headlines from the President’s address, was a
feeble gesture rather than a damaging blow. The raider surfaced at
1905 (Pacific time), just five minutes after the President started his
~peech.~’For about twenty minutes the submarine kept a position
2,500 yards offshore to deliver the shots from its 5S-inch guns. The
shells did minor damage to piers and oil wells, but missed the gasoline
plant, which appears to have been the aiming point; the military effects
of the raid were therefore nil. The first news of the attack led to the
dispatch of pursuit planes to the area, and subsequently three bombers
joined the attempt to destroy the raider, but without success.73The
reluctance of AAF commanders to assign larger forces to the task
2 82

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.