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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 386 …More threatening were Rommel’s forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air…
  • p. 387 …the route over which the Far East Air Force had received its thirty-five heavy bombers…
  • p. 551 …Formerly commander of the Far East Air Force in the Philip- * See above, pp. 396-97…
  • p. 561 …of an air force, depended upon a line of communications extending across the Indian and At…
  • p. 570 …the American air force would be used in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean area…
  • p. 571 …Accordingly, on 24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations under RAF supervision…
  • p. 577 …involved in estab- lishing and operating an air force in Asia. The report of the Grady…
  • p. 630 …Policy for Disposition of US and British Air Forces.” l6 This memorandum greatly extended the scope…
  • p. 797 …MacArthur argued that now was a pro- pitious moment to rush forces from the Indian and…
  • p. 819 …5 8 - 6 7 Eighth Air Force, I, 326ff.; Achtung Indianer, a history of VIII FC…
  • p. 850 …See also CBI; Air Forces, Tenth AF. 336407 3537 356, 3803 395-96, q857 496 India…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I1
shore exploded the next day, killing four men.64Attempts by Army
planes to bomb the submarine were apparently unsuccessful. In any
case, the air patrols were powerless to prevent a second attack on
Aruba on 19 February 6 5 and additional nuisance shellings of shore
installations in Puerto Rico on 2 March 1942 “ and of a refinery on
CuraGao on 19 April.67
The initial attack on Aruba prompted President Roosevelt to warn
the nation that enemy ships could shell New York City, or enemy
planes drop bombs on Detroit.68 Secretary Stimson added that the
public might as well prepare itself to accept “occasional blows,”
because the Army was determined not to disperse its forces in small
fragments to serve as security garrison^.^^ The New York Times, in
an editorial on 2 0 February, pointed out that American seaboard cities
were well within the enemy’s reach, but that the only danger was that
attacks might create a popular demand for protection at all costs. The
real need, it was suggested, was for the perfection of the defense
machinery already in e~istence.~’This raised the question of the
adequacy of the national air defenses; a few days later, events along
the West Coast provided a not too reassuring answer.
During the course of a fireside report to the nation delivered by
President Roosevelt on 2 3 February 1942, a Japanese submarine rose
out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast north of
Santa Barbara, and pumped thirteen shells into tidewater refinery
installations. The shots seemed designed to punctuate the President’s
statement that “the broad oceans which have been heralded in the past
as our protection from attack have become endless battlefields on
which we are constantly being challenged by our enemies.” “ Yet the
attack which was supposed to carry the enemy’s defiance, and which
did succeed in stealing headlines from the President’s address, was a
feeble gesture rather than a damaging blow. The raider surfaced at
1905 (Pacific time), just five minutes after the President started his
~peech.~’For about twenty minutes the submarine kept a position
2,500 yards offshore to deliver the shots from its 5S-inch guns. The
shells did minor damage to piers and oil wells, but missed the gasoline
plant, which appears to have been the aiming point; the military effects
of the raid were therefore nil. The first news of the attack led to the
dispatch of pursuit planes to the area, and subsequently three bombers
joined the attempt to destroy the raider, but without success.73The
reluctance of AAF commanders to assign larger forces to the task
2 82

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.