“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E
true. With what forces could so threatening a surface fleet have been
opposed? There is good evidence on this point, for the Fourth Air
Force actually issued an order to “attack and destroy” the enemy task
force. By good fortune, fourteen bombers destined for the Southwest
Pacific were in the vicinity; but it was found that the machine-gun
turrets on the planes would not operate, that there was no adequate
supply of oxygen for high-altitude operations, that only a few 300-
and 600-lb. bombs were on hand, and that the bombers would have to
enter an engagement without fighter H o w effective this
force-which was larger than any normally stationed along the coast-
would have been against a major enemy fleet must be left to the
imagination, but competent authorities were convinced that a vigorous
attack would have overwhelmed American air units a t any of the
chief points of defense along the western ~eaboard.~‘
In spite of this grave concern for the safety of the West Coast, the
first attack on a land objective in the Americas actually was directed
against Aruba, in the Caribbean. O n this small Dutch-owned island,
and on neighboring Curasao, were located large refineries which
processed oil from wells in Venezuela and currently accounted for
one-third of the United Nations’ supply of high-octane ga~oline.~’In
May 1940 the British had furnished small garrisons for the islands,59
but the increased danger after Pearl Harbor led the Anglo-American
planners a t the ARCADIA conference to decide that larger forces of
U.S. troops were needed.60 T w o flights of light bombers from the
Caribbean Air Force accordingly were sent to Aruba and Curasao in
mid-January 1 9 4 2 , ~ ~but attempts to send ground forces encountered
diplomatic difficulties. At the end of January, President Roosevelt
advised the President of Venezuela that, in deference to the latter’s
objections, the United States would delay the dispatch of troops; but
he indicated that the situation was so serious that steps would have to
be taken to safeguard the vital refineries.62 Public announcement of
the troop movement was made on I I February.63
Early in the morning of 1 6 February, aggressive enemy submarine
action in the Caribbean area began with an attack on shipping off the
harbor at San Nicholas, Aruba.” After destroying two tankers, a
submarine surfaced and shelled buildings of the Standard Oil refinery
and then moved upshore for further attacks on shipping. T h e damage
to the refinery was only superficial, but a torpedo which landed on
* See also p. 536.
2 8 1