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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E true. With what forces could so threatening a surface fleet have been opposed? There is good evidence on this point, for the Fourth Air Force actually issued an order to “attack and destroy” the enemy task force. By good fortune, fourteen bombers destined for the Southwest Pacific were in the vicinity; but it was found that the machine-gun turrets on the planes would not operate, that there was no adequate supply of oxygen for high-altitude operations, that only a few 300- and 600-lb. bombs were on hand, and that the bombers would have to enter an engagement without fighter H o w effective this force-which was larger than any normally stationed along the coast- would have been against a major enemy fleet must be left to the imagination, but competent authorities were convinced that a vigorous attack would have overwhelmed American air units a t any of the chief points of defense along the western ~eaboard.~‘ In spite of this grave concern for the safety of the West Coast, the first attack on a land objective in the Americas actually was directed against Aruba, in the Caribbean. O n this small Dutch-owned island, and on neighboring Curasao, were located large refineries which processed oil from wells in Venezuela and currently accounted for one-third of the United Nations’ supply of high-octane ga~oline.~’In May 1940 the British had furnished small garrisons for the islands,59 but the increased danger after Pearl Harbor led the Anglo-American planners a t the ARCADIA conference to decide that larger forces of U.S. troops were needed.60 T w o flights of light bombers from the Caribbean Air Force accordingly were sent to Aruba and Curasao in mid-January 1 9 4 2 , ~ ~but attempts to send ground forces encountered diplomatic difficulties. At the end of January, President Roosevelt advised the President of Venezuela that, in deference to the latter’s objections, the United States would delay the dispatch of troops; but he indicated that the situation was so serious that steps would have to be taken to safeguard the vital refineries.62 Public announcement of the troop movement was made on I I February.63 Early in the morning of 1 6 February, aggressive enemy submarine action in the Caribbean area began with an attack on shipping off the harbor at San Nicholas, Aruba.” After destroying two tankers, a submarine surfaced and shelled buildings of the Standard Oil refinery and then moved upshore for further attacks on shipping. T h e damage to the refinery was only superficial, but a torpedo which landed on * See also p. 536. 2 8 1
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