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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
fact that air force and antiaircraft artillery units, and civilian volun-
teers working with the warning service, were at the outbreak of war
taking positions in California for an exercise scheduled to begin on
I I De~ember.~‘
Once the news of the Japanese attack had been received on the
mainland, the Fourth and Second Air Forces, which shared responsi-
bility for defending the West Coast, readjusted their forces to provide
maximum protection for the major cities3’ In co-operation with the
Navy, off shore patrols were promptly instituted to provide warning
against carriers and to combat submarines. The aircraft warning serv-
ice was put into operation, with civilians hurriedly manning their
observation posts. Amateur radio stations were ordered off the air,
and unnecessary civilian flying was prohibited. The War Department
ordered the immediate movement of reinforcements for the Pacific
coast by air and fast trains. The supply of heavy bombers was so
limited that it was not found possible to immobilize any large number
by assigning them to stations along the coasts. Locally based air units
therefore consisted in large part of fighter aircraft, to which were
added antiaircraft artillery, barrage balloons, and searchlights. The
first reinforcement to reach the Pacific coast consisted of planes of the
1st Pursuit Group, which arrived at San Diego on 8 December; by 2 2
December this entire P-38 group had been transferred from Michigan
to California. An additional augmentation of pursuir strength was pro-
vided in mid-December by the temporary assignment to the Fourth
Air Force of a Marine unit, Air Wing I . Meantime, antiaircraft artil-
lery units had begun to reach the West Coast from inland stations, and
some regiments which were at ports of embarkation were diverted to
coastal defense as~ignments.~~
As these and other forces took up their defensive positions, coastal
communities suffered from an “invasion fever” which first showed
itself with the calling of an alert in San Francisco on 8 December. In
the afternoon of the 8th, rumors of an enemy carrier off the coast led
to the closing of schools in Oakland.“’ That evening, while residents
of the Bay area were having dinner, radio broadcasting suddenly
ceased, and this was followed by a blackout which lasted nearly three
hours. In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people, and self-appointed neighborhood
wardens rushed from door to door to help enforce the blackout.
Reports reaching Washington of an attack on San Francisco were
2 7 8

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