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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Edmonton”4 pages
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E human habitations were scarce, the terrain was wild and desolate, few radio aids existed, and maps were incomplete or misleading. Particu- larly poor conditions prevailed between Fort Nelson and Watson Lake, and in this area, as one pilot observed, “any haphazard guessing will lead to disaster.” 3 1 Bitter experience quickly demonstrated the costliness of sending untrained aircrews over this route. Essentially, then, for the first months of the war Alaska had no adequate air defense. T w o days before the outbreak of hostilities, Col. Everett S. Davis, pioneer Air Corps leader in Alaska, had aptly characterized the force a t his command as no more than “a cadre sent to the territory in advance of the main body.” 32 T o carry out plans, fortunately already agreed upon, for moving up the main body presented a task of the highest priority, for spring would bring weather favorable to a major enemy attack. Concern over the safety of the hemisphere was not limited to fears for its outposts. By an order of I I December, the Western Defense Command became a theater of operations; 3 3 on 2 0 December, a similar order provided for an eastern theater along the Atlantic By these acts, defense received priority over all training activity in both coastal zones, which were now raised to a new category of defense (Category C ) in recognition of the fact that minor attacks were not only possible but probable.35It will be noted that it was not anticipated that enemy forces could bring to bear any sustained attack on the con- tinental area, but, as Pearl Harbor had so forcefully demonstrated, a single and well-directed blow could inflict serious injury. That the chief focus of attention fell first on the Pacific rather than the Atlantic coast is explained by the former’s peculiarly exposed position following the Pearl Harbor attack.” Concentration of some of the larger aircraft plants in that region appeared to offer especially tempting bait for a Japanese raid. Fortunately, news of the start of war did not come as a complete surprise to the military forces there. T h e warning message sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command on 27 November 1941,indicating that negotiations with Japan in effect had terminated and that war was probable, had resulted in an acceleration of measures being taken to provide an aircraft warn- ing service.3EDefense arrangements were further facilitated by the .On the Atlantic side, principal concern was with the pros ect of submarine at- tack. AAF participation in the inauguration of emergency patroPs is separately treated below in Chapter 15. 277
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