“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Caribbean and Canal Zone could be said to be ready for any eventu-
ality.
America’s northwest outpost, Alaska, was also exposed to attack
after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of the region, but the Army was charged with local
defense of basesz4Though, according to currently accepted plans,
chief reliance for the latter function was placed on air power, at the
start of hostilities only a token force was stationed in Alaska.” A
measure of the inadequacy of that force was contained in a letter
written by the commander of the Alaska Defense Command, Brig.
Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Jr., on 8 December: “At dawn this morning
I watched our entire Alaska Air Force take to the air so as not to be
caught on the field. This force consisted of 6 obsolescent medium
bombers and I 2 obsolete pursuit planes.” t 2 5 It was not just poverty
in aircraft which made the Alaskan situation so perilous. There were
few well-developed airfields, and none at all in the Aleutians.26More-
over, speedy construction of bases promised to require enormous effort
because of the difficulties of terrain and weather. As one Alaskan
expert described the problem, there were “no home grown landing
areas . . . all have to be imported.” 2 7 Such tactical airplanes as were
available were of only limited use for want of an effective aircraft
warning service.28The supply of winterized aircraft suitable for arctic
flying conditions presented another problem,” and even aviation gaso-
line and antiaircraft ammunition were critically short. Alaskan military
leaders were concerned about the safety of men and equipment
because construction at the bases had been concentrated in small areas
for reasons of “economy of sewer pipe.” 3 0
None of these problems would have been so critical had Alaska not
been cut off by weather and distance from speedy reinforcement. T h e
lack of a highway or railway connection with the United States meant
that supplies had to go by air or by the time-consuming and vulner-
able sea route. T w o air routes were available, one following the coast
and the other going inland through Edmonton to Fairbanks, but both
were hazardous and poorly developed. A survey made in October
1941 had revealed that the coastal route was undesirable because of its
perpetual low-pressure areas, which created dense clouds and fogs.
The inland route offered better weather, but north of Edmonton
* See above, pp. 166-70.
t But cf. above, p. 170.
2 7 6