Documents / Document
This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Independence Day”9 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 Caribbean and Canal Zone could be said to be ready for any eventu- ality. America’s northwest outpost, Alaska, was also exposed to attack after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general strategic defense of the region, but the Army was charged with local defense of basesz4Though, according to currently accepted plans, chief reliance for the latter function was placed on air power, at the start of hostilities only a token force was stationed in Alaska.” A measure of the inadequacy of that force was contained in a letter written by the commander of the Alaska Defense Command, Brig. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Jr., on 8 December: “At dawn this morning I watched our entire Alaska Air Force take to the air so as not to be caught on the field. This force consisted of 6 obsolescent medium bombers and I 2 obsolete pursuit planes.” t 2 5 It was not just poverty in aircraft which made the Alaskan situation so perilous. There were few well-developed airfields, and none at all in the Aleutians.26More- over, speedy construction of bases promised to require enormous effort because of the difficulties of terrain and weather. As one Alaskan expert described the problem, there were “no home grown landing areas . . . all have to be imported.” 2 7 Such tactical airplanes as were available were of only limited use for want of an effective aircraft warning service.28The supply of winterized aircraft suitable for arctic flying conditions presented another problem,” and even aviation gaso- line and antiaircraft ammunition were critically short. Alaskan military leaders were concerned about the safety of men and equipment because construction at the bases had been concentrated in small areas for reasons of “economy of sewer pipe.” 3 0 None of these problems would have been so critical had Alaska not been cut off by weather and distance from speedy reinforcement. T h e lack of a highway or railway connection with the United States meant that supplies had to go by air or by the time-consuming and vulner- able sea route. T w o air routes were available, one following the coast and the other going inland through Edmonton to Fairbanks, but both were hazardous and poorly developed. A survey made in October 1941 had revealed that the coastal route was undesirable because of its perpetual low-pressure areas, which created dense clouds and fogs. The inland route offered better weather, but north of Edmonton * See above, pp. 166-70. t But cf. above, p. 170. 2 7 6
Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.