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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E dispersed to fields outside the Canal Zone, additional revetments were hurriedly built, and camouflage was employed wherever possible.” Air traffic regulations for the Canal Zone were revised to provide for a defended zone extending ten miles on either side of the canal.’’ December 1941 was marked by invasion fears in Panama and throughout the Caribbean region. Hostile carriers were reported on 8 December along the Pacific approaches to the canal. Again on 10 December the Navy reported that radio transmissions indicated a concentration of enemy vessels to the west of the canal. T h e W a r Department relayed a report that a carrier had been sighted off the coast of Mexico.20O n the Ioth, convincing evidence was received to the effect that the Vichy regime had turned over the French fleet to the Germans.’l T h e next day one of the French vessels at Martinique was reported to have left the harbor, and plans were drafted for joint Navy and AAF action to meet what might be a new threat to the Because of all these reports, a special alert was maintained for several days throughout the Caribbean, and, as the tension approached its height, an episode occurred which indicated the inexperience of American forces. T h e incident came to be known as “the battle of Borinquen,” from the air base in Puerto Rico where it took place.2s Shortly after dark on 1 2 December, a report reached Borinquen Field to the effect that a large enemy transport had dropped anchor in a bay near by. Landing barges full of troops were said to be coming ashore. A junior officer, without investigating the matter, alerted and blacked out the field. A bomber was dispatched to attack the ship but, through neglect, no bombsight was on board. Nevertheless, bombs were dropped and small boats in the bay were strafed. Meanwhile guards at the gates of the airfield saw tracer bullets, thought they detected sol- diers approaching, and opened fire with machine guns, firing several thousand rounds. T h e next day it was discovered that the affair had been caused by an innocent American freighter which had been at sea without radio communication and had not heard of the start of war. T h e firing on shore was caused by the accidental discharge of the rifle of a sentry, which had led to an extended exchange of fire between adjacent guard posts; fortunately the aim was poor. The incident gave proof of the need for better control of both ground and air personnel and for more careful direction by experienced senior officers during periods of alert. It indicated that much remained to be done before the 2 7 5
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