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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Independence Day”9 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 the Sault Sainte Marie canals, aircraft plants along both coasts, oil refineries off the coast of Venezuela, bauxite mines in the Guianas, and cryolite deposits-needed in making aluminum-at Ivigtut, Green- land. Military commanders, impressed with the damaged reputations which had been caused by Pearl Harbor, demanded large reinforce- ments to assure the safety of the area each was charged with defend- ing." Had the War Department listened to all these pleas, the existing air force would have been dispersed in small and ineffective units, and the AAF would have been required to surrender any early hope of building an offensive force. A system of priorities was essential, and, because the chief fear was of further carrier raids by Japan, initial air defense arrangements took the form of emergency reinforcements for Panama, Alaska, and the continental West Coast." A great deal of attention had been given before the war to the defenses of the Panama Canal, and to a superficial observer this target might have appeared to be well defended in December 1941.+There were, to be sure, three pursuit groups and the equivalent of two bom- bardment groups on duty in or near the Canal Zone, and these units had in addition to obsolete equipment more than IOO reasonably mod- ern airplanes.I2 T h e appearance, however, was misleading, and the following fundamental weaknesses demanded immediate remedial measures: of the airplanes assigned, only one squadron of B-17's was capable of operating at high altitudes; only two ineffectual radar sta- tions were available; neither the Army nor the Navy had enough planes to provide adequate offshore patrols; and aircraft bases were so concentrated that a surprise raid on two fields, situated only five miles apart, might have destroyed two-thirds of the tactical planes assigned to defend the ~ana1.I~ Officials in Washington were aware of the danger to the canal and gave priority to furnishing nine additional heavy bombers.l* Pursuit reinforcements were provided from within the Caribbean Defense Command by transferring twenty-five P-40's from Puerto Rico to the Canal Zone, a movement completed on 14 December.15 At the end of December, eighty additional pursuit planes arrived in Panama from the United States1' The critical need for aircraft warning instru- ments was eased by the arrival on 26 December of four mobile radar sets.17Meantime, AAF officers in Panama had taken local measures to increase the readiness of their units. During December, planes were * See above, pp. 160-66. 2 7 4
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