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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
D E F E N S E O F T H E W E S T E R N H E M I S P H E R E T h e same grave view of the situation had been adopted by -he Air W a r Plans Division of the Air Staff in an estimate drafted on 8 Deceni- ber. Word had been reteived that the attack on Pearl Harbor had left only one Gattleship in complete readiness there. This drastic shift in the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in con- junction with the existing uncertainty over the status of the French fleet, meant that a world-wide change in naval potentials had occurred. Even the sea lanes in the North Atlantic appeared to be open to raiders, with consequent peril to Iceland, Greenland, and defense plants along the eastern coast of the United States.’ T h e loss off Malaya on 10 December of the British capital ships Prince of W d e s and Repulse added to the pessimism. An air estimate of the situation two days later concluded that the enemy could reach virtually any vital installation located along the coasts of the Americas. A detailed list of enemy capabilities indicated that Axis forces might successfully attempt any of the following operations: T h e capture or isolation of Alaska. Attacks on the West Coast by air, sea, or land. Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of the Galapagos Islands. Air operations against the Panama Canal. Bombing of oil refineries in Peru or Venezuela. Seizure of airports and bridgeheads in Brazil. T h e fomenting of revolutions in Latin America. Attacks on the East Coast, perhaps after taking a lend-lease base. T h e capture or isolation of Greenland or Iceland.9 These first estimates undoubtedly reflect the shock resulting from the enemy’s initial victories. As was proper, they sought to cover all con- ceivable eventualities. But they serve to emphasize the urgent demands of the moment, the necessity, while providing reinforcements for hard pressed outposts and carrying forward plans for attack of the enemy’s vital establishments, to meet immediate and new requirements for an adequate defense of the Western Hemisphere. Air Defense Activities in the Period of Alerts and Alarms With the extremely limited resources available to the Army Air Forces in December 1941, it was impossible to provide even token defenses for all vital targets in the hemisphere. A host of advocates- both in and out of the Army-arose to press the claims of each of the “most vital” installations or areas, among these being the Panama and 2 7 3
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