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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 Mr. Neuberger wrote, the Northwest was blacked out from Puget Sound to southern Oregon, radio stations had been off the air for six- teen hours, and enemy aircraft were reported near the mouth of the Columbia River. It was not known whether the reports of enemy activity were founded on fact or rumor, but “men and women whose Congressional representatives less than a month ago voted overwhelm- ingly against repeal of the Neutrality Act are now prepared to believe such reports implicitly.” And on the preceding night “store windows in Seattle which did not dim were smashed by irate citizens.” An official estimate of the danger was given to the nation by Presi- dent Roosevelt in a radio address on 9 D e ~ e m b e r . ~The Chief Executive admitted that the losses a t Pearl Harbor constituted a serious setback and bluntly told the people to prepare for a long war against powerful foes. H e warned that the initial attack could be repeated “at any one of many points in both oceans and along our coast lines and against the rest of the hemisphere.” Summing up the terrible lesson which had been contained in the rain of bombs on American ships and planes in the Pacific, the President suggested that it ought to be clear to every citi- zen “that our ocean-girt hemisphere is not immune from severe attack- that we cannot measure our safety in terms of miles on any map.” At the same time, Mr. Roosevelt outlined views which were to be reiter- ated through the discouraging months of the first half-year of disaster and retreat, namely, that although the country might be attacked, nothing must deter the nation from its principal job of preparing to take the war to the enemy. Supporting the apprehensions of the people and the President’s warning, there were sober estimates of the situation by responsible mili- tary leaders. As early as 8 December, the Navy reported that the losses sustained in Hawaii had left the Pacific Fleet unable to carry out the tasks assigned to it in the existing war plan,4 and the next day Secretary Stimson reported to President Roosevelt that the War Department plan for the defense of the Pacific coast had been based on the security provided by Hawaii and the fleet, and that “the present attack has left the West Coast unprotected.” There was felt to be a grave possibility that the Japanese might, by renewed attacks, capture islands in the Hawaiian group ‘ and thereby penetrate the Pacific defense triangle (Alaska-Hawaii-Panama) . Even without reducing Hawaii, the enemy was in a position to carry out raids against aircraft plants and ship- building installations along the Pacific seaboard.’ 272
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