Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
One factor which affected the direction of air combat operations
had no reference to the text of the new circular. That was the personal
relation of General Arnold to air force commanders in the theaters
and in continental commands. Such a factor is by nature imponderable,
difficult either to describe or to document; but something of its flavor
may be sensed in a perusal of the extensive correspondence between
Arnold and air force commanders in the theaters-particularly in the
“operations letters” which flowed regularly between the combat zones
and Washington. There was in this correspondence no violation of
the conventions of military channels; rather it constituted an effort,
attended by varying degrees of success, to inform, encourage, and
often to placate AAF generals scattered throughout the world. In an
officer corps as small as was that of the prewar Air Corps, it was
natural that all senior officers be acquainted. If this heightened a t times
the understandable rivalry among air commanders for the inadequate
forces and supplies available, it also made possible a certain indirect
control from Washington through letters written more often in the
“Dear TOO~Y”or “Dear Miff” tone than in approved A G O style.
Thus in practice the Army Air Forces and its commanding general
came to assume a role far more important than that prescribed in the
reorganization of 9 March 1942. AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most important re-
spects the AAF enjoyed tacitly a quasi-equality with the Army and
Navy rather than the parity with the A G F and ASF which was its
legal status. O n I 5 June the W a r Department, in a revision of AR 95-5,
repeated the definition of the AAF mission as it had been carried in
Circular 59. A few days before, the Chief of the Air Staff had written
that “the main objective of the Army Air Forces is to operate ef-
fectively against the enemy the maximum number of organized units
and airplanes possible.” ’” This was a much broader interpretation of
functions than that which had been officially designated to the AAF.
In general it was also a more accurate description of AAF activities.
Something of those activities may be seen in the following chapters
which describe the manner in which the strategy laid down at
ARCADIA was carried out in the several theaters.

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.