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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

Open the PDF at page 317 Original source ↗

“Sea”60+ pages

  • p. 10 …the major responsibility for coverage of over- seas operations, and in the fall of 1942 he…
  • p. 53 …this department in operations over land and sea, but none offered an acceptable solution to the…
  • p. 58 …Because of the traditional importance of sea power in the national scheme of defense, Mitchell’s…
  • p. 59 …as the tactics of the ground and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion…
  • p. 64 …entirely dependable force” for operating a t sea, and the Army, which “with its own air…
  • p. 74 …find a limited career on the high seas beyond the operational radius of aircraft. In 1920…
  • p. 76 …units should be attached to ground and sea forces as auxiliaries.9*But, so long as…
  • p. 83 …the conduct of air operations over the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain…
  • p. 86 …Aviation alone cannot pro- tect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea, but it…
  • p. 96 …certain responsibilities for the protection of coastwise sea lanes. But the Navy’s obligations, in contradistinction…
  • p. 97 …traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed aboard a carrier, the airplane could…
  • p. 98 …least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing seaward reconnaissance units…
  • p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
  • p. 107 …It is the only weapon which can engage, with equal facility, land, sea, and other air…
  • p. 108 …a great nation as land power and sea power, and there is no hope for victory…
  • p. 112 …advance of contact either upon land or sea, and that victory can- not but incline to…
  • p. 114 …responsible for coastal defense, convoy protection, and sea and antisubmarine patrols. There was apparently little co…
  • p. 118 …they made relatively little provision for air-sea rescue of highly trained personnel. In the matter…
  • p. 119 …As opposed to land and sea operations, in which the defensive attitude was easier than the…
  • p. 127 …Recon- naissance and sea rescue work also figured in Luftwaffe operations. The badly outnumbered Norwegian air…
  • p. 128 …in combined operations with the land and sea forces.” In keeping with French military traditions, however…
  • p. 133 …Atlantic and in the Irish and North seas. The attempted air blockade achieved a moderate degree…
  • p. 138 …tradi- tional policy of freedom of the seas and which denied to our govern- ment the…
  • p. 154 …Such additions to a com- bination of Japanese, Italian, and German sea forces would have imposed…
  • p. 155 …force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had bit- terly resented Air Corps…
  • p. 157 …the point where it could cover all sea and land areas from which enemy air power…
  • p. 162 …The Caribbean Sea was shaped somewhat in the fashion of a very flat wedge of pie…
  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 177 …Near East, India, and the Far East. Sea communications, upon which logistical support of these widely…
  • p. 181 …Hemisphere, support of naval forces in maintaining sea communica- tions, and attacks on enemy shipping within…
  • p. 188 …And to protect the security of bases and the sea lanes which connected them with Amer…
  • p. 198 …and to insure the safety of essential sea communications.'s By the first week of December…
  • p. 199 …Base commander, included inde- pendent action againsr sea, land, and air objectives, support of land and…
  • p. 201 …and aircraft warning outposts fringing the Caribbean Sea." Dis- tributed among the military fields and installations…
  • p. 204 …and against attacks by air, land, and sea forces, while the Navy mission was to support…
  • p. 208 …thorough reconnaissance and observation of the air, sea, and land approaches to the Canal Zone.” Existing…
  • p. 211 …base would put an increased strain on sea com- munications a t a time when shipping…
  • p. 235 …and cargo ships in harbors and at sea, confirming the general assumption that some major move…
  • p. 246 …But as the day advanced the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed in…
  • p. 249 …the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of Japan.17 Japanese officials interviewed after the…
  • p. 257 …a fruitless flight over the South China Sea, where an enemy formation had been From this…
  • p. 259 …Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their search over the South China Sea…
  • p. 268 …depots had been “completely ruined.” The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk and other naval craft…
  • p. 282 …and the prospect of breaking through the sea blockade with a naval escort for convoys was…
  • p. 286 …as its southward movement must be by sea, we counted on neutralizing, if not wholly containing…
  • p. 288 …maintenance of designated lines of communication, both sea lanes and air routes; forging and tightening a…
  • p. 323 …This drastic shift in the balance of sea power had exposed the Pacific coast and, in…
  • p. 325 …innocent American freighter which had been at sea without radio communication and had not heard of…
  • p. 326 …by the time-consuming and vulner- able sea route. T w o air routes were available…
  • p. 329 …They were enemy planes! I mean Japanese planes! And they were tracked out to sea. You…
  • p. 332 …a Japanese submarine rose out of the sea off Ellwood, a hamlet on the California coast…
  • p. 333 …though the mysterious object tracked in from sea seems to have vanished. At 0 2 4…
  • p. 348 …on 26 March 1942 to the Eastern Sea Frontier." It was accordingly within the Eastern and…
  • p. 362 …provide for the security of the principal sea routes and seven main air routes over 3…
  • p. 363 …I N C I P A L SEA A N D A I R R O…
  • p. 364 …because the Japanese had cut the only sea and air lanes over which available reinforcements, such…
  • p. 372 …around Africa and up through the Red Sea to Egypt. A large base and an assembly…
  • p. 419 …T h e former was engaged only in long-range over- seas operations, while the latter…
  • p. 433 …a key point in the defense of sea and air routes through the South Pacific, and…
  • p. 435 …an eastern invasion force would move down through the Molucca Sea to occupy Manado, Kendari, and…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
One factor which affected the direction of air combat operations
had no reference to the text of the new circular. That was the personal
relation of General Arnold to air force commanders in the theaters
and in continental commands. Such a factor is by nature imponderable,
difficult either to describe or to document; but something of its flavor
may be sensed in a perusal of the extensive correspondence between
Arnold and air force commanders in the theaters-particularly in the
“operations letters” which flowed regularly between the combat zones
and Washington. There was in this correspondence no violation of
the conventions of military channels; rather it constituted an effort,
attended by varying degrees of success, to inform, encourage, and
often to placate AAF generals scattered throughout the world. In an
officer corps as small as was that of the prewar Air Corps, it was
natural that all senior officers be acquainted. If this heightened a t times
the understandable rivalry among air commanders for the inadequate
forces and supplies available, it also made possible a certain indirect
control from Washington through letters written more often in the
“Dear TOO~Y”or “Dear Miff” tone than in approved A G O style.
Thus in practice the Army Air Forces and its commanding general
came to assume a role far more important than that prescribed in the
reorganization of 9 March 1942. AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most important re-
spects the AAF enjoyed tacitly a quasi-equality with the Army and
Navy rather than the parity with the A G F and ASF which was its
legal status. O n I 5 June the W a r Department, in a revision of AR 95-5,
repeated the definition of the AAF mission as it had been carried in
Circular 59. A few days before, the Chief of the Air Staff had written
that “the main objective of the Army Air Forces is to operate ef-
fectively against the enemy the maximum number of organized units
and airplanes possible.” ’” This was a much broader interpretation of
functions than that which had been officially designated to the AAF.
In general it was also a more accurate description of AAF activities.
Something of those activities may be seen in the following chapters
which describe the manner in which the strategy laid down at
ARCADIA was carried out in the several theaters.

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