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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 330 …Boeing in Seattle, Douglas and Lockheed in Los Angeles, and Consolidated in San Diego. In heavy…
  • p. 333 …Radars picked up an unidentified target 1 2 0 miles west of Los Angeles. Antiaircraft batteries…
  • p. 334 …belief that there were no planes over Los Angeles. But the Army did not publish these…
  • p. 335 …The Los Angeles Times,in a first-page editorial on 2 6 February, announced that “the…
  • p. 336 …I 1 to have been released over Los Angeles 93-may well have caused the initial…
  • p. 772 …Los Angeles Times, 2 7 Feb. 1942. 87. Ibid. 88. Ibid. 89. Quoted in Los Angeles…
  • p. 773 …Editorial, N e w York Times, 28 Feb. 1942. 91. Los Angeles Times, I Nov. 1945…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
One factor which affected the direction of air combat operations
had no reference to the text of the new circular. That was the personal
relation of General Arnold to air force commanders in the theaters
and in continental commands. Such a factor is by nature imponderable,
difficult either to describe or to document; but something of its flavor
may be sensed in a perusal of the extensive correspondence between
Arnold and air force commanders in the theaters-particularly in the
“operations letters” which flowed regularly between the combat zones
and Washington. There was in this correspondence no violation of
the conventions of military channels; rather it constituted an effort,
attended by varying degrees of success, to inform, encourage, and
often to placate AAF generals scattered throughout the world. In an
officer corps as small as was that of the prewar Air Corps, it was
natural that all senior officers be acquainted. If this heightened a t times
the understandable rivalry among air commanders for the inadequate
forces and supplies available, it also made possible a certain indirect
control from Washington through letters written more often in the
“Dear TOO~Y”or “Dear Miff” tone than in approved A G O style.
Thus in practice the Army Air Forces and its commanding general
came to assume a role far more important than that prescribed in the
reorganization of 9 March 1942. AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most important re-
spects the AAF enjoyed tacitly a quasi-equality with the Army and
Navy rather than the parity with the A G F and ASF which was its
legal status. O n I 5 June the W a r Department, in a revision of AR 95-5,
repeated the definition of the AAF mission as it had been carried in
Circular 59. A few days before, the Chief of the Air Staff had written
that “the main objective of the Army Air Forces is to operate ef-
fectively against the enemy the maximum number of organized units
and airplanes possible.” ’” This was a much broader interpretation of
functions than that which had been officially designated to the AAF.
In general it was also a more accurate description of AAF activities.
Something of those activities may be seen in the following chapters
which describe the manner in which the strategy laid down at
ARCADIA was carried out in the several theaters.

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.