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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
had been manifested in the fashion in which the Air Staff had com-
piled AWPD/r in August,” and it was to be more pronounced after
the reorganization of 9 March 1942. The fact that in the several staff
committees ancillary to the CCS and JCS the AAF members were peers
of their Army and Navy opposite numbers encouraged that attitude,
which had been tacitly supported by the War Department on z De-
cember when it authorized the Air Staff to communicate directly with
the air staff of the British Joint Staff Mission.ll’
An astute English member of one of the staff sections serving the
CCS was once contrasting, from his own wide experience, the dif-
ferent fashion in which his British and American colleagues inter-
preted their functions.’17 It was his contention that in such an agency
-say, for example, the Combined Planning Staff-the British members
acted as a team with full authority to resolve differences of opinion
without consulting their respective service chiefs and thus were able
to present to the Combined Chiefs a single approved report. Con-
versely, he thought the American members brought to a meeting the
opinions of the heads of their respective services, and lacked power
to compromise those opinions without reference to higher authority.
His explanation for the difference he believed to exist was succinct:
You see, fundamentally, you have a system of dictatorship. Your three Service
chiefs are dictators. So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief of the Naval Staff, but also Admiral of the US.Fleet.
He can do anything he likes with the Fleet-make everybody stand on their
heads if he wants to, sack anybody at a moment’s notice. The same applies in
the other Services. General Arnold’s control of the US. Air Force is as com-
plete, virtually, as is Hitler’s control of Germany. He is a complete dictator.
Now, under that system ...everybody’s career from the bottom upwards de-
pends on his pleasing the man above him, and as they rise, the answer is, “DO
what Arnold wants and you will get on in the Air Corps.” Be discovered doing
something Arnold does not like and Arnold sacks you-like that.
These observations were made a t the height of the air war in Eu-
rope; they were made informally and with some pardonable exaggera-
tion to emphasize an argument. Sober judgment could no more
confirm the purported dictatorial powers of the service chiefs than it
could transform the genial “Hap” into a Fuehrer. But it was significant
that to an observant ally the U.S. service commanders possessed widest
powers, and that in that respect the AAF differed not at all from the
U.S. Army and Navy.
* See above, pp. 146-47.
266

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