“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
had been manifested in the fashion in which the Air Staff had com-
piled AWPD/r in August,” and it was to be more pronounced after
the reorganization of 9 March 1942. The fact that in the several staff
committees ancillary to the CCS and JCS the AAF members were peers
of their Army and Navy opposite numbers encouraged that attitude,
which had been tacitly supported by the War Department on z De-
cember when it authorized the Air Staff to communicate directly with
the air staff of the British Joint Staff Mission.ll’
An astute English member of one of the staff sections serving the
CCS was once contrasting, from his own wide experience, the dif-
ferent fashion in which his British and American colleagues inter-
preted their functions.’17 It was his contention that in such an agency
-say, for example, the Combined Planning Staff-the British members
acted as a team with full authority to resolve differences of opinion
without consulting their respective service chiefs and thus were able
to present to the Combined Chiefs a single approved report. Con-
versely, he thought the American members brought to a meeting the
opinions of the heads of their respective services, and lacked power
to compromise those opinions without reference to higher authority.
His explanation for the difference he believed to exist was succinct:
You see, fundamentally, you have a system of dictatorship. Your three Service
chiefs are dictators. So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief of the Naval Staff, but also Admiral of the US.Fleet.
He can do anything he likes with the Fleet-make everybody stand on their
heads if he wants to, sack anybody at a moment’s notice. The same applies in
the other Services. General Arnold’s control of the US. Air Force is as com-
plete, virtually, as is Hitler’s control of Germany. He is a complete dictator.
Now, under that system ...everybody’s career from the bottom upwards de-
pends on his pleasing the man above him, and as they rise, the answer is, “DO
what Arnold wants and you will get on in the Air Corps.” Be discovered doing
something Arnold does not like and Arnold sacks you-like that.
These observations were made a t the height of the air war in Eu-
rope; they were made informally and with some pardonable exaggera-
tion to emphasize an argument. Sober judgment could no more
confirm the purported dictatorial powers of the service chiefs than it
could transform the genial “Hap” into a Fuehrer. But it was significant
that to an observant ally the U.S. service commanders possessed widest
powers, and that in that respect the AAF differed not at all from the
U.S. Army and Navy.
* See above, pp. 146-47.
266