“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
F U N D A M E N T A L B A S E S O F S T R A T E G Y
General, AAF, could affect the planning and control of combat op-
erations.
In reality the influence of AAF Headquarters on the actual conduct
of the war went far beyond a literal interpretation of Circular 59.
Here, as so often in the course of the war, it proved impossible to
separate multiple functions held by one person, and what Arnold
could not do as Commanding General of the AAF he might accom-
plish as Deputy Chief of Staff. In that capacity he had helped frame
military policy during the months before Pearl Harbor; he had attended
the Atlantic conference; and he had sat sometimes-not always-in the
President's unofficial W a r Council.''1 During ARCADIA, Arnold
had acted as one of the Anglo-American chiefs of staff; and with the
formation in February of the CCS and JCS he was designated un-
equivocally as a member of each. There was still a curious anomaly in
his situation. Within the W a r Department, Arnold was subject to
Marshall as Chief of Staff, and though the latter had long since proved
his interest in the cause of air power and had favored Arnold's in-
clusion in the CCS,"* there were still the stubborn facts of seniority
and rank: Arnold had only received his third star with the advent of
war and was not to be made a four-star general for another year.l"
Within the CCS and JCS there was no hierarchy and legally, at least,
the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, the Army Chief of
Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations shared equal responsibilities
and powers. And it was as a member of those committees rather than
as commander of the AAF per se that Arnold was to exert his most
important influence in the air war.
This tendency reached on down into the Air Staff. T h e policy
initiated in AR 95-5 of giving the AAF representation in the General
Staff was extended in Circular 59; the ultimate objective was that
roughly half the members of that body should be air officer^."^ If this
looked on paper as an equitable solution, it was not wholly satisfactory
to the Air Staff. Perhaps the crux of the matter lay in the relationship
between A W P D and W P D , with its peculiarly important influence
in formation of strategic policies and in the conduct of operations. In
October 1941,AWPD had objected that WPD was trying to monopo-
lize planning functions which were more appropriate to the Air Staff
and suggested that responsibilities for planning be divided along func-
tional lines between the two offices.'15 This was in reality an effort
to establish two distinct and correlative agencies; the same attitude
2 6 5