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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
of the existing system and raised no objections to the proposed
changes.’ O 8 The results of the deliberations of McNarney’s committee
were incorporated in War Department Circular 59, issued on t March
1942 and effective on 9 March. As a circular, its provisions lacked
permanent validity.
The new directive abolished GHQ. The field forces remained under
the control of the General Staff, and the War Plans Division (later
OPD) assumed planning and operational functions over all theaters
of operation and the four defense commands. T o care for Zone of
Interior functions, three autonomous and co-ordinate commands were
established under the Chief of Staff-the Army Air Forces, the Army
Ground Forces, and the Services of Supply (later Army Service
Forces). The General Staff was reorganized to include a more equable
proportion of air officers. This arrangement removed a long-standing
grievance by giving the air arm equal status with the ground arm, if
not with the Army itself. It did away, too, with the internal friction
which had stemmed from the ambiguous division of authority between
the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps and the Air Force Combat
Command. Those agencies indeed were eliminated in the new AAF,
and the functions of the former were divided between a reorganized
Air Staff and a number of subordinate commands in the Zone of In-
terior. As for the AFCC, its very raison d’ktre had disappeared during
the early months of the war. Of the four continental air forces pre-
viously assigned to it, the First and Fourth had been turned over to
the Eastern and Western Defense Commands, respectively, and the
Second and Third had become essentially agencies for unit training.log
For all his elevation from Chief, AAF to Commanding General, AAF,
Arnold had been shorn of the limited combat functions he had pre-
viously enjoyed by virtue of his control over the Combat Command.
Ostensibly, the Army Air Forces had been reconstituted merely as
a supply and training agency. That fact may have been overlooked
by the casual reader of public announcements of the new “stream-
lined” War Department organization, which according to one jour-
nalist was so pleasing to air officers that they “practically trod on
air.” 1 1 0 But the limitation was clearly indicated in the new statement
of the AAF mission-‘‘to procure and maintain equipment peculiar
to the Army Air Forces and to provide air force units properly or-
ganized, trained and equipped for combat operations.” In theory it
was only through W a r Plans Division that Arnold, as Commanding
264

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.